



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

19980616 094

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-88-062

CONTENTS

30 DECEMBER 1988

PARTY, STATE AFFAIRS

Estonians Challenge Proposed USSR Constitution Changes	1
Writers, ETA, Popular Front Voice Objections [MOLODEZH ESTONII, 2 Nov 88]	1
Komsomol Groups Speak Out [MOLODEZH ESTONII, 4 Nov 88]	2
Deputy Goryunov on Representation [P. Goryunov; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 8 Nov 88]	2
Academics Issue Statement [K. Rebane, R. Khagelberg; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 8 Nov 88] ...	3
Russian Speakers Back Republic's Rights [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 10 Nov 88]	4
Rayispolkom Officials on Election Proposals	
[I. Kappanen, T. Torgo; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 10 Nov 88]	4
Law Professor Details Constitutional Debate	
[A. Favorskaya; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 27 Nov 88]	5
Ukraine Presidium on Amendments [PRAVDA UKRAINY, 24 Nov 88]	9

MEDIA, PROPAGANDA

Politizdat Official on Upcoming Publication of Political, Economic Textbooks	
[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 46, 12-18 Nov 88]	11
Goskomizdat Official on Plan to Reprint Long-Unpublished Major Monographs	
[S. Spiridonova; MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 Sep 88]	11
MOLODAYA GWARDIYA Editor Proposes Changes in Book Publishing Practices	
[N. Mashovets; PRAVDA, 13 Oct 88]	13

HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY

Latsis on Role of Stalin's Cult of Personality in Soviet History [O. Latsis; ZNAMYA No 6, Jun 88]	17
Purge Victim Searches For Fellow Labor Camp Prisoner	59

REGIONAL ISSUES

Yakovlev, Pugo Hold Discussion With Latvian Farm Workers [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 11 Aug 88] ...	60
Yakovlev Responds to Questions From Latvian Intelligentsia [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 12 Aug 88]	70
Yakovlev, Pugo Address Latvian Party Ideological Aktiv [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 13 Aug 88]	81
Yakovlev Talks With Workers At Latvia's Straume Production Association	
[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 13 Aug 88]	89
Latvian Popular Front Member Questions Direction, Goals of Interfront	
[Ya. Porietis; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 4 Nov 88]	94
Estonian Officials Challenge Constitutional Changes	95
Tartu Officials Meet for Critique [N. Grigoryeva; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 4 Nov 88]	95
Estonian Deputies Prepare for Meeting [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 5 Nov 88]	96
Estonian Representatives in Moscow [F. Kaazik; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 11 Nov 88]	97
Tartu Russian Section of Estonian Popular Front Meets	
[N. Grigoryeva; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 3 Nov 88]	97
Internal Troops Official, Soldiers on Work of Troops in Yerevan	
[A. Gazazyan; KOMSOMOLETS, 4 Oct 88]	98
Authorities Seek Eyewitnesses, Photos in July Yerevan Riot Death	
[V. Provotorov; KOMSOMOLETS, 4 Oct 88]	99
Armenian Enterprises Report Post-Disturbance Status [KOMSOMOLETS, 4 Oct 88]	99
Progress Reported in 18-21 September NKAO Disturbance Investigation [KOMMUNIST, 7 Oct 88]	100

Motivations of Yerevan Hunger Strikers Examined [G. Rubinyan; KOMSOMOLETS, 4 Oct 88]	100
Lebanese Student Expelled from USSR for Yerevan Disturbance Activities [KOMMUNIST, 9 Oct 88] .	101
New Leadership in Azerbaijan Begins Eradication of Corruption [N. Demidov, Z. Kadymbekov; PRAVDA, 11 Nov 88]	101
Scholars Discuss Current, Past Soviet Nationalities Policies, Issues [I. Krupnik, et al; KOMSOMOLETS, 1 Nov 88]	104
Three-Republic Roundtable on 'Nationalities Issues, Literary Process' [T. Kaplinskaya, T. Kulevas; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 26 Oct 88]	110

Estonians Challenge Proposed USSR Constitution Changes

Writers, ETA, Popular Front Voice Objections
180000245 Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian
2 Nov 88 p 4

[Appeal of the Council of Commissioners of the Estonian Popular Front and ETA writers and journalists]

[Text] Writers and Journalists Believe:

The open party meeting of the EsSSR Union of Writers, held on 31 October, concluded that the draft USSR laws on Changes and Amendments to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) and on Elections of USSR People's Deputies are contrary to the principles of democratization proclaimed by the 19th All-Union Party Conference and completely disregard the interests of the union republics. It is impossible to change this orientation of the drafts with any changes in wording. The meeting supported the proposal on convening a special session of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet and on rejecting these drafts.

On the initiative of the primary party organization and the Estonian Popular Front support group of the Estonian Telegraph Agency [ETA], at an open party meeting on 1 November the collective of the ETA discussed the draft USSR laws on Changes and Amendments to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) and on Elections of USSR People's Deputies. A decision was unanimously passed which pointed out that the draft laws submitted by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for nationwide discussion are contrary to the Leninist principles of the nationalities policy, socialist federalism, and sovereignty of the union republics. They are antidemocratic in nature, which is not conducive to creating a legal state, and are contrary to the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Based on the above, the participants of the open party meeting of the ETA passed a decision to support the proposal to remove from the agenda of the 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet these draft laws and to create an All-Union Constitutional Commission in which all union republics would be equally represented. The draft law drawn up by the commission would then be submitted for nationwide discussion.

Those at the meeting also supported the proposal of the meeting of chairmen of EsSSR rayispolkoms and ispolkoms of republic-subordinate cities to convene before 20 November 1988 a special session of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet and expressed support for the course toward democratization of public life of Estonia taken by the 11th Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee.

The decision was made to send the minutes of the open party meeting to the Presidium of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet and to inform colleagues in other union republics of our position. (ETA)

Appeal of the Council of Commissioners of the Estonian Popular Front to the Public and the Organs of State Power of the Estonian SSR

The Council of Commissioners of the Estonian Popular Front believe that the submitted draft laws "On Changes and Amendments to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law)" and "On Elections of USSR People's Deputies" do not correspond to the people's desire to turn the USSR into a democratic legal state. Passage of these draft laws would result in even greater centralization of the state and curtail the rights of union republics to organize their political, economic, and cultural life. As a result of the planned reforms, the Soviet Union would be turned into an even more completely unitarian state with a strong central power, which is not in keeping with the hitherto existing constitutional status of the USSR as a union of sovereign national republics.

The Council of Commissioners emphasizes that friendly cooperation of all Soviet peoples is possible only and exclusively if the rights of peoples are respected, under conditions of their free development and self-determination. The promulgated draft laws actually contribute to further exacerbation of the nationality problems under the cover of seeming equality and rapprochement.

Based on this, the Council of Commissioners proposes:

- To consider these draft laws contrary to the desire to democratize society and to the sovereign rights of the union republics, and to strive for rejection of these draft laws by the EsSSR Supreme Soviet and formation of a state commission in order to search for an alternative solution;
- To draw up and submit for nationwide discussion a draft Union Treaty in place of the draft Constitution;
- To convene no later than 20 November a special session of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet for determining a position on this issue;
- Taking into account the political situation which has taken shape, in all support groups and regional councils of commissioners to conduct meetings with their deputy of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet to discuss the submitted draft laws and to demand their rejection at the special session of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet;
- The Estonian Popular Front considers protecting the sovereignty of the republic and the struggle against super-centralizations of the central power to be the main task of the moment. Achieving this goal largely depends on the unity and determination of all democratically thinking residents of Estonia. The Council

of Commissioners calls upon all public organizations, societies, movements, soviets of labor collectives, and informal groups to join together to carry out democratic actions in order to prevent passage of the amendments to the Constitution in the presented form.

The Council of Commissioners expresses full approval to the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet from the Estonian SSR, who, firmly carrying out the will of their constituents, voted against passage of antidemocratic legislative acts at the recently concluded session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Council of Commissioners is convinced that the conduct of our deputies has become a moral lesson for all members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This has increased the people's trust in their representatives, which is especially necessary now when we are faced with a decisive struggle for continuing democratic development and for the rights of the union republics in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Council of Commissioners of the Estonian Popular Front.

Komsomol Groups Speak Out

18000245 Tallinn *MOLODEZH ESTONII* in Russian
4 Nov 88 p 1

[Statement by Komsomol groups, under the heading "We Are Discussing the Draft Laws on Changes and Amendments to the USSR Constitution and on Elections of USSR People's Deputies": "The Opinion of Young People"]

[Text] The Komsomol members and young people of the republic are discussing the draft laws on amendments to the USSR Constitution and on elections of USSR people's deputies at their meetings.

Members of the raykom buro and the Komsomol aktiv of Vilyandiskiy Rayon decided at their meeting to make a request of the young people of the republic to support their protest and begin collecting signatures against these draft laws, since they contain provisions directed at restricting the sovereign rights of the union republics.

The buro of the Kharyuskiy Raykom of the Estonian Komsomol discussed at its meeting the Draft Law on Changes and Amendments to the USSR Constitution and decided to demand that it be withdrawn from discussion and not be put on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The adopted decision also contains a paragraph demanding the creation of a commission made up of representatives of the union republics which should ensure a greater democratic nature in a new version of the draft

and guarantee observance of people's civil and political rights and grant the republics the right of veto when ratifying union laws, if they threaten to infringe upon the interests of the republics.

This resolution proposes, as a last resort, to hold a nationwide referendum on this issue.

Deputy Goryunov on Representation

18000245 Tallinn *SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA*
in Russian 8 Nov 88 p 4

[Article by P. Goryunov, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the Tartu-Sovetskiy Electoral District, under the heading "We Are Discussing the Draft Laws": "Prepare Its Platform"]

[Text] Lately, voting has become a matter which is not altogether simple. We are making difficult decisions, weighing every word. The votes "for" and "against" are carefully counted. I consider all this as signs of perestroika. Quite recently, it seemed that everything had been thought out for us, but the tension of the present-day political situation dictates quite a different line of behavior.

The other day, I was invited to a special session of the Tartu City Soviet. The people's deputies and members of the party gorkom discussed the most important issue of the proposed changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution. I listened to reports, some thoroughly substantiated and others summarizing the opinions of the broadest sections of the voters of large labor collectives and social organizations, and speeches. The session unanimously decided to reject the draft USSR law as antidemocratic and contrary to the trend toward expanding the rights of union republics, stated at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Although I did not have the right to vote at this session, I will say honestly that I also voted for this decision. Why? I will try to explain.

First of all, because this draft was drawn up in a non-democratic manner, without the participation of union republics. I consider this to be deeply wrong. When deciding issues affecting the interests of the population, its opinion must be taken into account. I have represented voters in various elective bodies for many years and know how keenly people react when their opinion is not considered; this fact itself offends them. Therefore, I consider correct the proposals of the Tartu deputies to remove this draft law from the agenda of the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and to create a state commission of representatives of the union republics to draw up a new document. Democratic laws can only arise in a democratic way.

I consider the claims my electorate has on the question of the republic's representation in the country's supreme organ of power to be legitimate. Now there are few

deputies from Estonia, and there will be even fewer if the amendments and changes are passed. This means that the Estonian delegation's point of view in the future also will not be taken into account in resolving issues in the USSR Supreme Soviet. This has already been experienced. For example, the Decree on the Responsibilities and Rights of the Internal Troops was passed at the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We also had remarks and suggestions regarding other document. We requested that our opinion be considered and carefully discussed and that passage of the decrees not be rushed. The deputy from Estonia, E. Paap of Kokhtla-Yarve, expressed this idea. However, the secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, T. Menteshashvili did not even inform the session that the Estonian delegation had its own opinion. There was nothing left for me to do but ask for the floor at the session. Although I was applauded, two deputies from other regions of the country spoke after me, who unequivocally supported the decrees. And they were passed by a majority of votes. If the procedure for passing such important documents were different, I am sure the results of the voting would have been different.

It is hard to guess now what kind of a situation will take shape with passage of the amendments and changes to the USSR Constitution. A great deal depends just on how we will be able to substantiate our position and find a common language with the delegations of other republics.

It is distressing that all this is being done in a hurry. Is it really possible in 1 month to discuss such an important document and prepare its platform? I think that the deputies of other union republics will also note at least the untenability of these time periods.

One of the speakers at the session in Tartu reminded us of the beginning of the USSR anthem: "An inviolable union of free republics." These are good words, and everything possible must be done today to preserve their true content. This means, above all, we must preserve the sovereignty of the republics so that each of them can call themselves the sacred word "free," and then our union will be inviolable.

Academicians Issue Statement

18000245 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 8 Nov 88 p 4

[Article by K. Rebane, president of the EsSSR Academy of Sciences, and R. Khagelberg, chief academician secretary of the Presidium of the EsSSR Academy of Sciences: "This Is What the Scientists Believe"]

[Text] Bringing the economy and the environment of the USSR out of the crisis situation, achieving a worthy place in the economic and intellectual life of the world community, raising the prestige of socialism, and constructive resolution of the complex situation which has developed as a result of the many years of ignoring Lenin's nationality policy are possible only if there is a

radical democratization of public life, a significant strengthening of the sovereignty of the union republics, and also a significant increase in the independence and responsibility of local organs of power in managing economic, social, and cultural development.

The general meeting of the EsSSR Academy of Sciences states that the draft laws being discussed were compiled without the participation of union republics. Passing them without making fundamental changes can exacerbate the crisis phenomena in the life of our country and will create a threat to the foreign policy initiatives of the USSR.

Based on the need to demonstrate a high degree of responsibility and adherence to principles in discussing these draft laws, after hearing the speeches, the general meeting of the EsSSR Academy of Sciences resolves:

The basic provisions of the draft laws in question are contrary to the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Congress on democratization of the Soviet society and expansion of the rights of the union republics and, in essence, are a step backwards compared to the current Constitution and legislation in effect.

To consider it impermissible to include discussion of these laws on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

To make proposals to create on a democratic basis a commission, consisting of representatives of the union republics, for drawing up new drafts of the corresponding laws, beginning with the most important one—the Union Treaty.

To support the proposal to convene a special session of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet to discuss issues associated with these draft laws.

For members of the EsSSR Academy of Sciences, its organizations and associates to render all possible assistance to the Presidium of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet and other state bodies in revising the draft Union Treaty, drawn up with participation of the EsSSR Academy of Sciences, and also other draft legislative acts.

To send this resolution to the USSR Academy of Sciences and the academies of sciences of the union republics.

Considering the negative experience of blocking objective information and substituting misinformation for it, which has taken place in the recent past, and also due to the emergence of relapses of this practice in coverage of the ongoing process of perestroika in the EsSSR, to strive persistently to publish the full text of this resolution in the all-union mass media.

To send this resolution to the republic mass media of the EsSSR for publication.

To present this resolution to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet.

Russian Speakers Back Republic's Rights
18000245 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 10 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by the "Referendum" Group, Initiative Group of the Society of Russian Culture, the Society for Preservation of Monuments of Russian Culture in Estonia, and Initiative Group of the Russian-Speaking Section of the Estonian Popular Front: "Let Us Join Unite"]

[Text] A decisive stage is coming in the development of the political situation in Estonia. The draft Law on Changes and Amendments to the Constitution and the draft Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies, proposed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, have become the object of harsh criticism. The drafts have been drawn up in such a manner that they significantly infringe upon the sovereignty of the union republics. Central organs will be given the right to resolve those issues which we should decide ourselves. Regions of the country are being deprived of the opportunity to determine their own destiny independently. Passing such constitutional amendments not only will not bring the country out of the crisis, but will intensify it. Estonia is threatened with the danger of being turned from a leading republic into an economic and cultural province of the country. The interests of all its residents will suffer equally, regardless of their language or nationality.

Under these conditions, silence by the Russian-speaking population will be regarded as approval of the proposed draft laws and will actually result in betrayal of our own interests. Therefore, we appeal to all our fellow citizens of Estonia: Let us protect the rights of our republic. We must state our non-acceptance of this wording of the draft laws and begin drawing up alternative proposals on a constructive basis without mutual ultimatums.

Today we must cast aside our internal differences and speak out as a truly united front. One form of uniting—creating a Russian-speaking section in the Popular Front—was proposed by the Russian delegation back at the Forum of the People's of Estonia. But this is not the only possibility of consolidating forces. We support any forms of democratic unification of the residents of Estonia to protect the rights of the republic.

Residents of Estonia! We must not take a real step to meet one another half-way in the name of our common destiny.

The "Referendum" Group.

The Initiative Group of the Society of Russian Culture.

The Society for Preservation of Monuments of Russian Culture in Estonia.

The Initiative Group of the Russian-Speaking Section of the Estonian Popular Front.

Rayispolkom Officials on Election Proposals
18000245 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 10 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by I. Kappanen, chairman of the Kalininskiy Rayispolkom, and T. Torgo, secretary of the rayispolkom: "A Step Backwards"]

[Text] The editorial staff continues to receive comments on the draft USSR laws on changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) and on elections of USSR people's deputies (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 23 October and 25 October).

Today, we are giving I. Kappanen, chairman of the Kalininskiy Rayispolkom, and T. Torgo, secretary of the rayispolkom, an opportunity to speak on this matter.

In the 2 weeks that have passed since the promulgation of the drafts, there was time to interpret, compare, and discuss them pretty well. But even at a first, fleeting glance, one is struck by their non-recognition of the sovereignty of the union republics, the Estonian SSR in particular. We back the proposal of the Tartu conference of chairmen of rayispolkoms and gorispolkoms of republic-subordinate cities to convene a special session of the EsSSR Supreme Soviet before 20 November. In our view, individual amendments to the proposed drafts will not change their essence. Therefore, we support the proposal of the commissioners of the Estonian Popular Front to withdraw these draft laws from nationwide discussion and not include them on the agenda of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and also to create a state constitutional commission of representatives from the union republics to prepare new draft constitutional acts.

With regard to specific provisions in the promulgated draft laws on changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) and on elections of USSR people's deputies, first of all, we do not agree with the interpretation of three basic election principles of universal, equal and direct suffrage. How, for example, can universal suffrage be tied to citizenship status?

Or what does equal suffrage mean, which is mentioned in Article 3 of the draft law on elections? "A voter has one vote for each electoral district," it states. But if you consider that a voter is not simply a pensioner, for example, but also a member of the Komsomol, a trade union, and some other public organization, he does not have one vote but several, compared to the ordinary citizen. What kind of equal suffrage is this?

Direct suffrage, if you think it over, is not at all direct, but multistage. The parliament is formed not by the voters, but by a congress of deputies.

A union republic, it seems to us, should have the right of veto when voting at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But not everything is decided by a majority vote.

Another important aspect must be reflected in the new constitution—the question of concluding a republic union treaty upon switching to regional cost-accounting. The drafts do not mention this aspect at all.

Now, about particulars.

The objectivity of Article 55 in the draft law on elections raises doubts. It states that a USSR people's deputy candidate receiving more than half of the votes of the voters taking part in the voting is considered elected."

The corresponding Article 15 of the draft republic law of the EsSSR on elections to local soviets states: "The candidate receiving the largest number of votes is considered elected." There is no stipulation about those who participated in the voting. Possibly, this is simply a stylistic error, but, in our opinion, it nevertheless limits the rights both of voters and deputy candidates.

The aspect in Article 38, where it talks about the district election meeting, also seems questionable. This meeting is convened by the district election commission and is held after nomination of deputy candidates is completed. This is fine. But if "no more than two deputy candidates are nominated, the district election meeting is not held." Why? Then, the district election meeting is given the right to decide submission of candidates for registration. It seems to us that the district meeting, in the composition envisioned, is not authorized to decide the fate of the deputy candidates. Only the voters have this right.

Now a few words about an innovation: the USSR Committee of Constitutional Oversight. Yes, there should be such a committee. But we see its infinite right to intrude into the laws of the union republics again as non-recognition of their sovereignty. There will be no sovereignty; full cost-accounting, to which not only our republic is preparing to switch, is also impossible. The draft states that "the USSR Supreme Soviet revokes the decisions and decrees of the Councils of Ministers of the union republics if they do not conform to the Constitution and laws of the USSR." Then why have a constitutional oversight committee to duplicate its actions? Why must double supervision of the republics be established?

There are also many new, reasonable aspects in the draft laws. Thus, we fully agree that leaders of executive and administrative organs now will not be elected simultaneously as deputies of the Supreme Soviet, whereas today, for example, there are about 40 members of government in the EsSSR Supreme Soviet.

At last, public organizations have also been given the right of choice at their plenary sessions and conferences.

For the first time, a religious leader can be chosen as a USSR people's deputy candidate from a public organization, which seems fair to us.

The new term of 3-4 months allotted to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet for the fall and spring sessions also seems justified to us.

There is also much interesting proposed in the drafts concerning the election campaign. Thus, Article 46 talks about the individuals empowered by the deputy candidate who campaign for him and can use the services of radio, television, and the printed word. What is more, a deputy candidate (Article 45) can present his program to the voters. True, this is technically difficult to imagine. Are the republic's mass media really able to provide all candidates the opportunity to speak? If not, some of them will have their rights infringed.

Questions, questions... At 2:00 P.M. on 15 November, all rayon deputies elected in Tallinn, including deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and EsSSR, will gather at the House of Political Education (2 Lenin Boulevard) to discuss the draft laws and make decisions. We hope that the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet will take into account the desires of the union republics, consider an alternative variant, and adopt a draft which is not contrary to the principles of the 19th Party Conference. The existing draft is a step backwards in the process of democratization and perestroika.

Law Professor Details Constitutional Debate
18000245 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 27 Nov 88 pp 6, 7

[Interview with Ivan Fedorovich Kazmin, senior scientific associate of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation and doctor of juridical sciences, by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent A. Favorskaya: "On Sore Points of the Draft Laws..."]

[Text] These days, a visitor from Moscow—Ivan Fedorovich Kazmin, senior scientific associate of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation and doctor of juridical sciences—has been speaking to many collectives of our republic. Our correspondent asked him to share his opinion on the problems which are being discussed at these meetings.

[Kazmin] I have had the opportunity to study the practice of discussing the all-union draft laws on changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution and on elections, and have participated in this discussion. I would like to express my views on those points which most often raise questions.

Article 113 of the draft law on changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution, for example, has caused much confusion. Many comrades believe that the USSR

Supreme Soviet's review of certain issues listed in this article is an invasion into the republic's jurisdiction and restricts its rights. We cannot examine all the points of this article here due to their large number, but let us dwell on one typical example. That is the entry contained in contained in Paragraph 7, Article 113 of this draft. Here it states that the USSR Supreme Soviet exercises legislative control of environmental protection. Colleagues believe that the union republic could resolve these issues entirely. This and similar criticism of individual paragraphs of Article 113 are based to a considerable extent on misunderstanding.

The fact is that the vast majority of these issues are not at all intended to be made the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Overall, there are very few issues which are the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR. These are chiefly issues of defense, state security, and foreign relations. The majority of other issues listed in the disputed paragraphs of this article pertain to the so-called joint jurisdiction of the USSR and union republics.

What are these? Let us look clearly at this same example of protecting nature. Let us assume that the Estonian SSR were to take such effective measures which would stop completely the pollution of the Baltic with domestic and industrial waste from the territory of its republic. Does this mean that its coastal waters will become completely clean? No. The first gale will bring contaminated water from other areas of the Baltic Sea to its shores—you see, the Baltic is being polluted not only by Estonia, but also by 3 other union republics and about 10 foreign states. The entry stating that the USSR resolves issues of environmental protection is provided to resolve those issues which go beyond the limits of geographical, natural, and other capabilities of the republic. Roughly the same situation exists in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea basin and in other large reservoirs.

Delimiting the joint jurisdiction of the USSR and union republics is done precisely along this principle. The union republic does what it is capable of doing with its own forces. The Union does what is beyond the republic's capabilities. Even if the USSR wanted to take upon itself the resolution of all ecological or other issues within the republics, it would be unable to do this because of the country's enormous size. And this is one of the reasons the Union has no desire at all to intrude into the jurisdiction of the union republics. Individual comrades' suspicions on this account are totally unfounded.

[Favorskaya] What can you say in this case about protecting mineral resources? Estonia is more worried about the right of central departments to use its resources, an unqualified right.

[Kazmin] The departments do not have such a right. Under law, the union republic has great opportunities to protect its natural resources. Under law, organs of the union republic resolve the question of granting land and mineral resources for industrial development or other

industrial purposes. They have the necessary legal capabilities to defend their interests. It is impossible to overstep them. The example of phosphorites is often cited. You see, the republic still defended its interests.

[Favorskaya] The draft law under debate also includes under union jurisdiction organizing management of the national economy, social and cultural construction, the budget and finance system, remuneration of labor, pricing, taxation, and so on and so forth. What is left for the republic?

[Kazmin] For some reason, your comrades understand that this is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union, but this is all joint jurisdiction. The Union decides only the bases affecting the interests of all union republics. I gave the example of the Baltic Sea—how the jurisdiction is delimited, what the republic can do, and what the Union can do. Otherwise it is impossible to resolve these issues, neither technically, financially, nor geographically. To do this, it is envisioned that part of the joint jurisdiction is exercised by the Union, and partly by the union republic. One supplements the other. Simply, the very nature of these phenomena dictate such logic; it is not being imposed from without. Unfortunately, many in Estonia do not know this, do not understand this, or it has not been explained to them. Many are convinced that these points are the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union. While, in fact, the republic has the same and equally broad rights here as it did before. What is more, in connection with the decisions of the 19th Party Conference, the party leadership and the supreme state organs of the USSR have now taken a firm course towards expanding the rights of union republics and local organs of power and management.

[Favorskaya] This is indisputable in the party documents, but in the draft law...

[Kazmin] Suspicions that the Union is intruding into the jurisdiction of union republics, I already said, are unfounded.

[Favorskaya] Then, I would like you to clarify just how this desire to expand the rights of the union republics is reflected in the draft law?

[Kazmin] We will touch upon certain questions on this draft law further, but for now I will say that the decisions have been made and documents are being prepared, such as a special draft law on expanding the rights of union republics. A law is being prepared on regional cost-accounting, which proposes to expand sharply, and I emphasize sharply, the rights of the republics in management of the economy. No one has abandoned or plans to abandon this course. The Union does not have the slightest desire to restrict the rights of the union republic. Quite the contrary.

The expansion in the rights of union republics can also be seen in the example of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee. Desires have been expressed (including in Estonia) to expand the participation of the union republics in this committee. Taking these desires into account, the deputy commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet recommended to the Union Parliament to provide for representation of the republics in the Constitutional Oversight Committee. Thus, the union republics are being given a new, never before known opportunity to protect their rights and interests. In this committee, they can question as contrary to the USSR Constitution any act of Union organs which, in their opinion, infringes upon their constitutional rights.

[Favorskaya] What other doubts have been expressed in discussing the draft laws?

[Kazmin] Article 108 of the draft law on changes to the constitution, its point that the USSR reviews questions of the makeup of the USSR, evoked a debate. Many comrades in Estonia perceived this as restricting the right of a union republic to withdraw freely from the Union. In actuality, free withdrawal of republics from the Union is still covered by Article 72 of the 1977 Constitution. This article remains in full force, and no one has revised it. What does Paragraph 2, Article 108 have in mind? The fact is that under conditions of expanding democratization and glasnost, many nationalities are raising questions which they did not raise before: about changing their legal status. Thus, for example, Crimean Tatars who reside in several union republics want to have their own autonomy. Germans, several million of whom live in various republics, also want to have their own autonomy. Certain autonomous republics would like to become union republics. This entry was envisioned to resolve those issues which go beyond the capabilities of one union republic but concern the interests of all or a number of union republics. Obviously, only the Union can resolve these issues; an individual republic is unable to do so. Now, since comrades in the Baltic area suspect that this entry is aimed against their right to withdraw from the Union, the deputies have recommended changing it.

Many fears have been expressed in Estonia over the possibility of instituting a state of emergency in individual regions of the country. This is Paragraph 13, Article 119 of the draft, where it refers to, among other things, instituting special forms of control when necessary. All countries overseas have such legislation, including the European countries with a developed bourgeois democracy; there is nothing unusual about this. We used these forms during the Great Patriotic War. Certain elements are used in all countries during major natural disasters and the like. No one had in mind to use them for political purposes, especially against the interests of the union republics. We have not had and, I hope, will not have this. It is intended that this paragraph will also be improved. Work is also being done to improve other questionable wording.

The deputies also recommended to the USSR Supreme Soviet to consider proposals received from a number of union republics on the feasibility of election of courts by higher soviets in order to make them more independent of local organs.

[Favorskaya] There is much debate over the issue of the sovereignty of a union republic and its place in the federation.

[Kazmin] We will talk about Estonia, since this bothers other republics less.

All federations of the world, including ours, are organized on the principle that its members transfer part of their jurisdiction to the federal organs. As we have already said, we have a few issues which are the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR, and the rest are joint jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the union republic completely. This is a general principle of organizing all federations. Another general principle is that federal law prevails over the law of the federation members on those issues which are under jurisdiction of the federation.

Confederations, that is, a union of states based on an agreement on individual issues, are not very common now at all; they were formed in the past mainly in the interests of the defense of several states against the threat of war. In a confederation, a common territory of the union participants was not created, and a unified system of national economy and federal organs was not created. As a rule, these confederations either broke up or grew into a federation. The United States began as a confederation, and up until 1922 we were close to being a confederation. A federation is a closer form of economic and other cooperation of its participants and more beneficial for them; therefore, this form has become more massive and more vital. Some comrades in Estonia are raising the question of a confederation. I read about this and was asked such questions. That is why I wanted to answer this question.

[Favorskaya] Forgive me, but is the union treaty form, in your opinion, categorized as a federation or confederation?

[Kazmin] It can also be considered a federation. When our federation was being created in 1922, it was made official by a union treaty. No one has annulled this treaty, it completely retains its historical importance, and all of its fundamental provisions are covered in our constitution. Of course, many new issues have emerged during these years which were not known at that time—in particular, ecological issues. No one thought, for example, that we would have to protect and save the Baltic, the Aral Sea, or Lake Baykal; there were no problems here. There were no problems with nuclear safety or with nuclear power plants. These new problems also gave rise to new jurisdiction both of the USSR and

union republics. Most likely, in connection with the rapid development of science, technology, and industry, such problems will also crop up in the future. They also will have to be resolved.

We have covered the most typical questions I have been asked. True, I am still often asked why these two draft laws were drawn up in this manner—not by the union republics but by a union organ. I will say that they were drawn up in the usual traditional procedure which has taken shape in practice. Historically, union organs have prepared large-scale drafts of union acts, and the republics have prepared republic drafts. No one ever disputed this procedure. These drafts were also prepared in the same manner. It was recommended that the union republics give their views on these drafts. All who so desire and scientific institutions have been making their suggestions, and the rich experience of discussing the materials of the 19th Party Conference has been used. Not a single union republic asked that these drafts be prepared in other than the traditional procedure. There were an extremely large number of suggestions for the drafts; experts and staff workers of the USSR Supreme Soviet preliminarily classified and processed them. The suggestions were reported to the deputies, and they made the decisions. That is how these drafts were prepared. Now, after these drafts were promulgated and began to be discussed, some are beginning to say that this procedure is undemocratic and that the union republics should prepare the draft.

Incidentally, no one assumed that criticism would come from this side. Now, in preparing the law on regional cost-accounting, which although it is a union law but affects the interests of the republics and other regions, all union republics are involved in this work. But to some extent the republics also participated in preparing the draft laws now being discussed. In particular, such acts are always sent to the union republics for conclusion, and they state their suggestions, comments, and objections concerning them. Therefore, under not circumstances can it be said that such drafts are prepared in secrecy from the union republics. Nothing of the sort. And if your republic had considered it necessary beforehand, it also could have demonstrated its initiative to the maximum extent. Here there are no problems and, apparently, the comrades simply approached this too emotionally. By the way, other union republics did not feel hurt or offended.

[Favorskaya] How do you explain this?

[Kazmin] It is hard to guess, this is not a legal question but more of a psychological one, and I would not like to meddle in this field.

[Favorskaya] Then, let me ask you this. In the opinion of many people who write us, only one side has been presented in the debate on these questions on the pages of the central press and on television. Why are the voices of the opponents not heard?

[Kazmin] I do not agree with such an assertion. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has already received more than 130 suggestions. They contain many constructive amendments to the drafts. Comrades express their disagreement with individual points or consider them imperfect and suggest a new, in their opinion, better solution.

[Favorskaya] Have any republics other than the Baltic republics disputed, for example, the paragraph on sovereignty?

[Kazmin] I am not aware of such facts.

I understand that many wordings of the draft were not complete enough and contributed to the emergence of fears and even suspicions. Obviously, we need more trust in one another and more competence in discussion, we must not shut ourselves off and become withdrawn in our own region. We would not refuse, for example, if we were asked to explain these issues, as we are now discussing here. I think that businesslike, constructive, and thorough discussion of all wordings could help remove the misunderstanding without the heat of passions. Incidentally, if it were possible to have predicted such a reaction, I think that a greater time period for discussing the draft laws could have been established. Now, in preparing for the Plenum on Nationality Issues, it has been decided to publish the reports in 2 months.

Often your comrades ask why the entire complex of issues are not being tackled right away. It is very difficult to do this. The country is large, there are many issues, and there are different interests. We must find solutions which are acceptable for all population groups. We have chosen the "lesser evil"—to resolve these issues by stages: first create new organs on a more democratic basis so they themselves can then develop this reform. At the initial stage, no one expressed any objections to this variant, they were stated later. But I want to add that many are dissatisfied with the slow, in their opinion, development of political reform and do not want to wait too long. Do you understand? There is not just your opinion here, but also the opposite opinion. You do not want to hurry, but a very large number of people from various republics do not want to go slow. In addition, we have talked about most of your objections and are taking them into account.

[Favorskaya] Were you asked about the right of veto at the meetings?

[Kazmin] Yes, and quite often. What is there to say? We have never had such a right in our legislation, and I cannot say that it is widely used in other countries. Generally speaking, the right of veto is not quite a federative institution. The president in some countries has the right of veto with respect to the parliament. But I do not know of a case in which an individual member of a federation has the right of veto with respect to the entire federation. This practice is fraught with certain

dangers. To some extent, it would counterpose an individual member of the federation against the rest of its members and the interests of the federation as a whole. In my view, this would severely weaken the federation. I am afraid that the harm from this institution would be greater than the benefit. I think that it is better to have other mechanisms here to protect the rights of the individual member of a federation. For example, I pin great hopes on the Constitutional Oversight Committee. Our political reform does not end with the passage of these draft laws, it will develop. We can begin thinking about some other constructive mechanisms to safeguard the interests of the individual federation member.

[Favorskaya] You do not believe that they do not want to listen to the voice coming from the Baltic republics?

[Kazmin] No, I do not believe that. Already now, back before convening the Supreme Soviet, on almost all the sore points which we have touched upon here, a deputy commission recommended that the Supreme Soviet made decisions which take into account your objections.

But your amendments to Article 74 of your constitution are, in my view, a revision of the fundamentals of our federation. I think that this was an extreme decision and that it was possible to find other legal mechanisms. You have placed the right of an individual member of the federation on all issues, even on issues which are strictly the jurisdiction of the Union, above the right of the federation. Nowhere in the world is it like this.

[Favorskaya] But is this not in the spirit of the overall democratic movement in the country?

[Kazmin] I think that this has gone too far. In addition, such fundamental issues are always resolved by all members of the federation. These are, after all, fundamental principles, and you have decided them, these issues, individually. I think it is possible to create mechanisms, and they are being created, which would not undermine the principles. Democratic changes in our country increase the opportunities of each union republic to defend its own interests by legitimate, parliamentary means. I think that democracy will also create new guarantees for considering the interests of individual population groups and individual union republics.

We are moving away from the old course of centralization, from the dominant influence of departments. About 160,000 various instructions for the Union which restricted the rights of enterprises, associations, and regions have been rescinded. We will free ourselves from these chains. Therefore, we should not look pessimistically here. On the contrary, we have every reason to look to the future with optimism.

Ukraine Presidium on Amendments

AU3011101488 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
24 Nov 88 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] On 23 November a routine session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium examined the discussion taking place in the republic on the draft laws on amendments and supplements to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law), and on the election of USSR people's deputies.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium noted that the aforesaid draft laws marked a stage in the radical reform of the political system, a stage vitally necessary for restructuring, and that they were aimed at the further democratization of public and state life. These documents reflect the 19th All-Union Party Conference ideas about deepening the process of restructuring, and about creating conditions necessary for the formation of a socialist legal state.

The discussion on the draft laws is being pursued in the republic in an active manner and with interest. The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has received more than 106,000 responses from citizens and collectives and more than 7,300 amendments, amplifications, supplements, changes, and new formulations proposed on specific articles have been submitted. At the meetings of labor collectives and public organizations, in living quarters, in the republic-level and local press, in television and radio broadcasts, and in letters, citizens are expressing their full understanding and support for the clauses of the draft laws, and are approving them as a whole. The proposals emphasize the urgent need to change the structure, the procedure of forming, the functions and activity of representative state power organs, as well as of the judicial system, and thus to provide conditions suitable for accomplishing tasks at the subsequent stages of political changes.

At the same time critical remarks are being made concerning a number of draft articles and clauses. In particular, they apply to a clearer delineation between the competences of union- and republic- level state power organs, the duration of USSR Supreme Soviet sessions, the ability of the voters to elect deputies only from among candidates outnumbering the vacant mandates, the age qualifying for active and passive election, the procedure of nominating candidate deputies by public organizations and of voting for them, the procedure of electing people's judges, the expansion of the Committee for Constitutional Surveillance by coopting representatives of union republics, the specification of the latter's commissions, and other issues. Individual authors pronounced themselves against a number of draft clauses. Conclusions drawn from all proposals and remarks received by the Presidium are being conveyed to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

During the discussions on the draft laws the Supreme Soviet Presidium, local soviets, editorial boards of newspapers, journals, television, and radio have also received

many constructive proposals concerning the competence of local soviets, particularly their economic and financial relations with enterprises subordinated to higher organs of power, concerning social and cultural construction, the development of the national culture and language, and ecological problems.

In the decision adopted by the Presidium; in the report delivered by N.G. Khomenko, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium secretary; and in the speeches delivered by A.M. Roshchupkin and V.P. Shcherbina, Presidium deputy chairmen; by G.I. Gutovskiy, G.P. Korneychuk, N.F. Moiseyenko, A.P. Nekhayevskiy, V.A. Plyutinskiy, V.I. Rybinko, N.M. Snigirev, V.A. Sologub, A.A. Fedorov, Presidium members; and by V.I. Zaychuk, Ukrainian SSR minister of justice, it was noted that the workers, kolkhoz peasants, representatives of public organizations and of the creative intelligentsia favored the draft laws aimed at accomplishing in time the first stage of reconstruction in the political system, a reconstruction upon which the entire democratization process in Soviet society will largely depend.

The laws on amendments and supplements to the USSR Constitution and on the election of USSR people's deputies, adopted at the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, will contribute toward ensuring the sovereignty of the soviets people's deputies as the basis of socialist statehood and self-management, toward expanding democratic foundations for their activity. The laws will boost their independence and initiative, will increase their responsibility in accomplishing economic, social, and cultural tasks, will specifically confirm the consistent implementation of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the further advance made toward authentic democracy, and toward restituting soviets to real power; they will also provide suitable conditions for the working people's practical participation in administering state and public affairs.

In their pronouncements and letters evaluating the draft laws, many working people have emphasized the principled importance of the policy firmly and consistently pursued by the party and the state to foster the internationalist unity of our society, to perfect and deepen interethnic relations. They emphasize that it is important to further promote one single national economic complex of the unified multinational state, the close cohesion among all peoples, and the fraternal mutual assistance among republics, oblasts, cities, and rayons, and sharply pose the need to resolutely rebuff all the attempts to undermine friendship and unity among our peoples, to fight the manifestations of ethnic isolation, and the artificial fomenting of interethnic problems.

In expressing the firm conviction and will of the Ukraine's people, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium is deeply confident that the family of the country's peoples will not allow our international unity, the basis of the Soviet Union's power, to be destroyed.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium feels that the amendments adopted at the session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet to Article 74 of that republic's constitution—that in certain cases the supreme state power organs of the Estonian SSR may establish limits in applying USSR legislative and other acts—contradict the precepts of the USSR Constitution, are very detrimental to the higher interests of the USSR as a socialist federation, and do not contribute either toward consolidating the unity and cohesion of Soviet peoples, or toward further unfolding the process of restructuring in our society.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet expresses the confidence that the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will ensure that the provisions of the USSR Constitution are unswervingly observed throughout the country.

Oblispolkoms, as well as Kiev and Sevastopol Gori-polkoms have been instructed to meticulously scrutinize all the remarks and proposals made, to take steps in order to eliminate shortcomings in management and in services to the population, and to systematically inform the working people about the progress being made in fulfilling the plans for economic and social development and in complying with the voters' orders, and in settling the most acute local problems which affect the citizens' interests.

In drafting laws on amendments and supplements to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and on the election of Ukrainian SSR and local soviet people's deputies, permanent commissions of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the Presidium's appropriate working groups have been instructed to make wide use of the experience accumulated during the discussion on the draft union laws, and to take into account the proposals and remarks made concerning to problems that have to be settled in the republic.

The Presidium has examined the proposals and remarks set forth in reports rendered by permanent commissions and made by deputies to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on the issues discussed at the ninth session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation. The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers has been instructed to take steps to comply with the aforesaid proposals and remarks.

Also, other issues concerning the republic's state life were examined.

The Presidium session was addressed by V.V. Shcherbitskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary.

A.A. Titarenko, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and second secretary, participated in the debate.

The session was chaired by V.S. Shevchenko, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman.

Politizdat Official on Upcoming Publication of Political, Economic Textbooks

18300111a Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 46, 12-18 Nov 88 p 4

[Interview by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent with A. Soskin, Politizdat assistant editor-in-chief: "Textbooks for Adults". First paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The instructional year within the system of political and economic education of the workers has begun. In connection with this, many auditors and propagandists are interested in how things are going with the publication of textbooks for the new courses. Here is what Politizdat Assistant Editor-in-Chief A. Soskin told our correspondent regarding this matter.

[Soskin] This year we are publishing 10 instructional tests. Among them, 6 are for mass forms of education and 4 for the universities of Marxism-Leninism. Unfortunately, we cannot brag about the completion of publication of all these books by the start of the instructional year. For now, 6 of them have been published. These are: "Scientific Communism and the Problems of Renewal of Socialism" (head of author's collective V. Khalipov), "Current Problems in the Development of National Relations, International and Patriotic Education" (author's collective—E. Bagramov, Zh. Golotvin, E. Tadevosyan), "Current Stage of Development of the Socialist Alliance and Perestroika" (head of collective Yu. Shiryayev), "Scientific Atheism" (headed by M. Mchedlov), "Foreign Policy Strategy of the CPSU and New Political Thought in the Nuclear Age" (headed by N. Zagladin), "Problems of the Ideological Struggle in the World Arena" (headed by N. Kayzerov). The other four textbooks—"Soviet Economics: A New Quality of Growth" (headed by L. Abalkin), "Current Problems in Political Economics" (headed by V. Kulikov), "Ideological Work of the CPSU Under Conditions of Perestroika" (headed by Zh. Toshchenko), "The Communist Movement and the Struggle for Social Progress" (headed by S. Gililov)—are currently in press and will appear in November or December.

[Correspondent] Why such a delay?

[Soskin] The main explanation for the delay in publication of the textbooks, I believe, is the fact that it is extremely difficult to develop a full-fledged textbook. The many years of Politizdat experience testify to this fact: success in this matter is only beginning with the formation of author's collectives. These collectives must necessarily be made up of specialists who have a mastery of the pen. This, however, is not enough. The authors must also have conditions suitable for concentrated, introspective work on the textbook.

Today, entirely new requirements are being presented for textbooks. These have been presented in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, "On Reorganizing the System of Political and Economic Education of the Workers". Their essence is the fact that the basis of the instructional process must be the problematic approach,

while the textbooks are called upon to evoke dialogue, to compare various points of view, and to stimulate discussion between the students.

In our opinion, of all the prepared publications the one most closely approximating these requirements is the above-mentioned text on Soviet economics, written under the supervision of L. Abalkin, and the already published "Current Problems in the Development of National Relations, International and Patriotic Education". At least they do not try to evade the acute vital problems. Also, the textbook on national relations seems to us to be the first effort at illuminating this most complex topic without any fanfare and without any toast-proposing exclamations.

To a lesser degree, we as publishers are satisfied with the textbooks entitled "Ideological Work of the CPSU Under Conditions of Perestroika" and "Scientific Communism and the Problems of Renewal of Socialism". It is true that the first has not yet been issued, but the second has already had time to receive a portion of critical comments in the press. The fault of the publishers is that they, rushed by deadlines, did not allow such an experienced author as V. Khalipov to realize the editor's comments in the necessary measure.

[Correspondent] So what does Politizdat propose for improving work on the textbooks?

[Soskin] Just one thing. To strictly adhere to the rule stated in the Central Committee's resolution on the reorganization of political and economic education. We must introduce instructional courses only after programs have been developed for them and textbooks published. This, of course, does not mean that the preparation of textbooks should be dragged out for years. However, the organizers must allow time for thoroughly working out the structure, content, and form of the publication, for discussion, review and editing of the manuscripts. Also, we cannot help but ask the following question: If the 10 textbooks for 1988 are experiencing such difficulty in clearing the path for themselves, is it realistic to expect to ensure quality preparation and timely publication of the 21 titles planned by the All-Union House of Political Enlightenment for 1989, if only one manuscript has been received to date?

Goskomizdat Official on Plan to Reprint Long-Unpublished Major Monographs
18300111c Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Sep 88 p 3

[Interview by S. Spiridonova with V. Cheremnykh, assistant editor-in-chief, USSR Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade], Socio-Political Literature Main Publications, and candidate in historical sciences: "...Serving as a Stepladder to Reason." First three paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] The USSR Goskomizdat has approved the long-range plan for publication of books on our country's history, as well as the works of leading Russian and

Soviet philosophers, economists and jurists which have not been published for a long time in our country. [The complete list of works planned for publication in the 1988-2000 period is published on pages 7-10 of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 38, dated 23 September 1988.]

There are 212 publications in this plan: 116 on Russian and Soviet history, 27 works of philosophers, 21 publications in the series "Literary Heritage of Russian Thinkers" (which will be included in the Leningrad University publications), 33 works devoted to Russian economic history and economic thought, and 15 works by jurists.

The mail received by our editorial staff contains many letters asking us to give a more detailed account of the upcoming books. We addressed the questions posed by our readers to the assistant editor-in-chief of the USSR Goskomizdat Socio-Political Literature Main Publication, Candidate in Historical Sciences V. Cheremnykh.

[Spiridonova] Viktoriya Mikhaylovna, how was the idea of publishing the works of our country's philosophers conceived?

[Cheremnykh] First of all, it was under the influence of the awakening, unusually high interest of the readers in the heritage of our social thought. This was very clearly evident by their attitude toward the publication of the works of the well-known historians Klyuchevskoy, Solovyev and Karamzin, and toward the works relating to our literary heritage.

Recently, in the course of active journal publication of forgotten or previously banned names, the unnatural gaps in the literary process have gradually began filling in, which we cannot yet say in regard to our scientific heritage. Here from the late 40's, entire currents, not to mention individual works, have disappeared from the history of scientific thought. In all the past years we have only once published, we are ashamed to say how little and how scanty—the philosopher of the last century A. Fedorov. And even then we "caught it good" for the propaganda of the works of this scientist-idealist. The materialists were always accepted for publication: Chernyshevskiy, Gertsen, Dobrolyubov, Belinskiy. And the knowledge of the current generations—not only the mass readership, but the specialists as well—was impoverished by the total oblivion, the dropping out from the history of science, culture, and philosophy of the works of idealist philosophers who reflected unusually interesting processes of development of ideas, their struggle, and ultimately—the forward movement of science.

On the whole, this was a negative process, since on one hand to deprive scientists and specialists of the possibility of becoming acquainted with different points of view means to impoverish their scientific outlook. On the other hand—it means forcing them at times to trod that creative path which had already been trodden previously

by someone else. And ultimately, it means to slow the movement of progress, since, as Karamzin once wrote, "the ages serve as a stepladder to reason".

[Spiridonova] Which of the philosophers of the past will we have the opportunity of meeting again, and when will their works begin to be published?

[Cheremnykh] Among the authors are Vl. Solovyev, P. Florenskiy, P. Chaadayev, V. Rozanov, I. Kireyevskiy, P. Kropotkin, M. Bakunin, A. Vvedenskiy and many others. Many works of Russian philosophers will be published by "Mysl." Nine books of selected works by Russian philosophers will be printed by the "Pravda" publishing house in 1989 in the form of a supplement to the journal VOPROSY FILOSOFII.

[Spiridonova] Yet our oblivion has touched not only upon philosophers. In Japan, for example, they still publish the economic works of A. Chayanov, while it was only a year ago that we "discovered" for ourselves the name of this remarkable scientist, and only then from brief newspaper and literary journal publications.

[Cheremnykh] Yes, the works of Russian and Soviet economists from the end of the last-middle of the present century are practically unknown to our readers, as is the essence of the discussions on the economic problems of development of the young Soviet state which took place in the 20's-30's. The interest toward them has sharply increased in connection with the economic reorganization currently taking place in our country, just as it has, we might add, toward legal problems.

Today the "Ekonomika" publishing house has organized a new press specializing in the publication of books on the history of national economic development and the development of economic thought. Already this year it will publish a collection of articles by economists of the 20's, devoted to a single state plan. S. Gusev, A. Kaktyn, L. Kritsman, and G. Krzhizhanovskiy are the authors of this collection. The works of M. Tugan-Baranovskiy, A. Bogdanov, A. Chayanov, and N. Kondratyev have been prepared for publication next year.

[Spiridonova] That means that the implementation of the long-range plan is already in progress, if, for example, we consider its realization with the publication of the first volume of the "History of the Russian State" published by the "Kniga" publishing house. (It is true, however, that this expensive facsimile publication is not affordable to many). The "Mysl" publishing house has also published selected philosophical essays and letters of M. Bakunin, and at the end of the year will also publish a 2-volume work by Vl. Solovyev...

[Cheremnykh] The reprinting of the works of S. Solovyev and V. Klyuchevskiy has also begun. Since we have touched upon the works of our country's historians, I would like to point out the fact that the long-range plan includes books whose authors were generally persona

non-grata for library and publishing house readers for many years. They were not published and they were not read. I will name but a few books from those planned for publication: M. Pokrovskiy, "Condensed Outline of Russian History"; N. Kostomarov, "Russian History in the Biographies of its Main Leaders"; "Russian 18th Century" in 4 volumes from the series "Publications of the Free Russian Press of A. I. Gertsen," which will include the notes of Catherine II, Ye. Dashkova, and Senator Lopukhin; A. Bogdanovich, "The Last Three Autocrats"; A. Tyutcheva, "In the Court of Two Emperors"; P. Kropotkin, "Notes of a Revolutionary"; A. Belyy, "Between Two Revolutions," and much, much more...

[Spiridonova] The section of the program devoted to the publication of works on the history of the Great October Revolution, the civil war and the Soviet period is read with great interest. Here we find "Selected Works" by N. Bukharin, the memoirs of A. Shlyapnikov and P. Dybenko, notes about the civil war by V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, and so forth. In short, most of these books were written by active participants in the events and, a most unusual fact, among the authors there are those who stood "on the other side" of the barricades. These are names which are so unexpected that, finding them on the list, one at first says to oneself: do not believe your eyes... In order to "adapt," one has to re-read the list, to get used to it, to "digest" it. Can it really be that the memoirs of Denikin, Kornilov, Rodzyanko, Milyukov, and Krasnova are going to be published?

[Cheremnykh] Yes, the publication of the memoirs by these authors—about the revolution and the civil war as described by the White Guard members—is currently being prepared by Voenizdat and by the publishing house of Kazan State University... The APN [USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences] plans to publish a number of other books, as for example, M. Rodzyanko's "Collapse of the Empire" and V. Shulgin's "Days." The "Mysl" publishing house will publish the memoirs of S. Vitte. Lenizdat [Publishing House of the CPSU Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom] will publish a book on Kerenskiy. MOSKOVSKIY RABOCHIY will print the "Recollections of a Terrorist" by B. Savinkov, etc.

[Spiridonova] Where will the publishers get these materials? Will they translate the memoirs from the language of the country where these books were published?

[Cheremnykh] The most interesting thing is that these books were published in the 20's in our country. For reprinting they will be taken from special collections of libraries, where one or two copies of these books have been preserved. The others were destroyed. Today the special collections are reclassifying the previously "arrested" books to public access, but due to the limited number of copies, very few people will be able to read them. That is why the decision has been made to reprint these books, to

give people the opportunity to gain a broader insight into the great events of the age, including also from the points of view of the enemies of the revolution.

[Spiridonova] Evidently, this same goal—the more comprehensive perception of history (not so far removed as the revolution, but still already history)—was in the minds of the compilers of the plan, who included in it the translated works of leading foreign military historians and political leaders who analyzed the events of World War II? These include "Russia in War" by A. Vert, "World War II" by W. Churchill, and "Recollections of a Soldier" by G. Guderian...

[Cheremnykh] "The Crusade to Europe" by D. Eisenhower, the "The Stalingrad Campaign" by G. Derr... Parts of these books were already published in our country, but long ago, in the 50's. Now they are going to be reprinted.

[Spiridonova] The publication plan is very interesting, but upon reviewing it, the opposing question immediately arises: can it be embodied in specific books today, under the conditions of democratization of the interrelations between the Goskomizdat and the publishing houses, when the publishing houses themselves determine what authors they will publish? Will the plan remain simply as a good intention addressed at inspecific publishers?

[Cheremnykh] No. The publishing houses are eagerly taking up this work, and everything that has been outlined for the most part already now has specific address.

[Spiridonova] Is there an indefinite part?

[Cheremnykh] Yes. This is a recommended list for regional and republic publishing houses, which they may use in compiling their thematic plans for the coming year. For example, it would be of interest for the university publishing houses to know the opinion of authoritative scientists (and the plan was compiled with their help), and to know which works by their fellow countrymen are interesting to this day and should be published.

MOLODAYA GVARDIYA Editor Proposes Changes in Book Publishing Practices

18300111d Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by N. Mashovets, editor-in-chief of the Komsomol Central Committee publication MOLODAYA GVARDIYA: "Who Are Books Published For?"]

[Text] In the past year-and-a-half alone, more than 30 articles have appeared in the press critically analyzing the new endeavors of the USSR Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade]. However, the Goskomizdat management sees few useful ideas in them. Yet in my opinion, it should take a more critical approach to the evaluation of

its activity. After all, as yet the entire reorganization in book publication has been reduced merely to the USSR Goskomizdat's cancellation of its own outdated directives and instructions.

Unfortunately, many of the current Goskomizdat innovations have also not been well thought-out. Sometimes they even run counter to the real publication process and the interests of the readers and authors. For example, of all the things that the USSR Goskomizdat leaders report in their numerous publications, it would be fruitless to look for figures telling how many books have been published in, say, 6 months. Or how this appears in comparison with the indicators for the analogous period last year? Alas, you will not find such data. And it is no accident. That is because the number of books published is not increasing, although the price on books is rising by leaps and bounds.

The fact is that, supposedly to combat the "book bugs" and "black market," and disregarding the opinion of the buyers themselves on this question, the USSR Goskomizdat has permitted the setting of so-called contract prices. As a result, the quality of books has not improved, their number has not increased, and the shortage has not been alleviated. Yet the buyer has begun spending noticeably more money for the purchase of books. In the last 6 months alone, millions of rubles were obtained from the public by this means. It is doubly sad that, as practical experience has shown, this tendency of uncontrolled growth in prices on books is continuing, and will continue in the future. In the book publication trade the increase in the cost of production is defined, despite certain specifications, as the main means of increasing the "trade mass." This in turn will not only reduce the solvency of the population, but will even more greatly narrow the circle of book buyers and will impoverish the selection in public libraries.

As we know, only a few central publication and printing houses are directly subordinate to the USSR Goskomizdat. Most are departmental, belonging to public organizations, artist's unions, or under joint control. Yet even these, with the exception of "Voyenizdat" and "Nauka," have become dependent on Goskomizdat, since they have been deprived of the right to sell their products directly and have been forced to do so through the Goskomizdat "Soyuzkniga," which retains one-fourth of the cost from the sale of each book. In this situation, especially with the setting of contract prices (up to two nominals), Goskomizdat is literally being showered with a golden rain.

Therefore, we can understand the desire by the heads of this department to persistently demand from the publishing houses that they reduce the number of titles of low-circulation books (scientific, poetic, etc.) and sharply increase the publication of those which are in particular demand, i.e., those on which the price can be raised. It has come down to where not only the circulation policy, but even the fate of a certain book as a whole

is today in fact determined by the trade workers, who place orders for it even before it is published. Even if we do not touch upon, let us say, the taste and the spiritual trappings of the trade worker, even if he is a Solomon, he is placed in such a situation that, for example, he will not order poetry, scientific books, or the works of young authors. Moreover, these must be advertised and effort expended, while a detective novel can be sold for 3 rubles (now it is already 5, we might add) not even at a bookstore counter, but, for example, to a friend from a shoe store "as barter goods."

And it is for naught, in my opinion, that the Gorkomizdat shrugs off critical comments. After all, it is not they who are right, but Academician D. S. Likhachev and all those who maintain that such innovations in book publication extremely complicate the path which works of original scientific and artistic thought must take to reach the general reader and, on the contrary, open wide the doors to mercantilism, bureaucratizing the all-union publication process.

As a panacea against shortages, Goskomizdat is today presenting the idea of the so-called all-union book publication programs. They are developed within this very same Goskomizdat, where manuscripts generally are not read, and thus can be oriented only toward things published in the periodical literature. The obvious nature of the conclusion that a standard circulation number of 100,000 copies is too low for a popular book in our country, with its multi-million population, makes it possible to include a certain title in the all-union program and to demand that the publisher print this book, already without any coordination (such a system nominally exists within Goskomizdat). In what volume? Why, in any volume you like—300,000, 500,000, a million. There are no limitations, no logic...

These programs, which are a sort of state order handed down by Goskomizdat, aside from all else, are rather superficially compiled.

However, this is not even the crux of the matter. All-union programs and various unlimited subscriptions in the large scale of our book trade smack of gigantomania and destabilize both the creative and the productive process within publishing houses. They create a hullabaloo around things which often bear the imprint not so much of talent as of market conditions. At times we get the impression that Goskomizdat is striving to turn publishers into printing-works which are handed down from above the assignments on whom to publish and in what volume. Yet at the same time it is afraid to take on the responsibility for a specific matter, as for example in the publication of books at the author's expense.

In and of itself, such a solution is timely. All the publishers applaud it, but... Judge for yourselves. Any publishing house must "find a place" in the printing-works first of all for its own planned book with circulation of, say, 100,000 copies. This is not an simple matter

even from a purely technical aspect. At the same time, from an economic standpoint it also affects numerous aspects of the viability of the publisher's collective, including, by the way, also the money deducted for the salaries of that very same Goskomizdat apparatus. Now they call for putting off the 100,000 copy book and submit for publication the manuscript, which will be issued in a circulation of 200 or 1,000 (the limit is 3,000) copies at the expense of the author himself. This is about the same as stopping the Togliatti automobile assembly line and making 1,000 shovels on it for use by the local gardeners. After all, there are also low-capacity printing houses. It would seem, what could be simpler—to allow the authors to print their poems, memoirs, and political treatises there. Yet here the radical question of our system arises: "Under whose responsibility"? This moment is cleverly formulated in the Goskomizdat decision: "The responsibility... is borne primarily by the author." And the second [basic responsibility], it is easy to understand, Goskomizdat ascribes to the publisher, although it could have, for example, in Moscow under the Buro of Polygraphic Services, or on Tsvetnoy Boulevard, put two or three of its associates in charge, who could read this "wonder-literature," sign it to press, and bear the responsibility after the author for its publication...

...I am reading one of the latest (signed 1 August) USSR Goskomizdat collegium resolutions entitled "On Measures for Reducing Time Required for Preparing and Publishing Books." The problem is a most current one, but... "It is necessary to understand that the long production times discredit our book publication and impart a moral, cultural, scientific-technical and economic loss," the first point states. What a discovery! Point two states: "Recommend that publishers install personal micro-computers directly in the publishing houses..." But there is not a word about how this is to be realized. Finally, point 13, the culmination, states: "Conduct in 1988 an all-union scientific-practical conference on the question of reducing the time for preparing and publishing books."

The current Goskomizdat policy has found generalized expression in the "Conceptions of Soviet book publication under current conditions and the prospects for its development to the year 2005." Ye. Timofeyev, editor-in-chief of the "Mysl" publishing house said aptly in this regard: "There is no serious, in-depth analysis which is based on the real state of affairs. As yet the situation in book publication is getting worse and heading toward a complete collapse. The conception diverges from the reality."

Book publication in the USSR is in an extremely neglected state. We might even say a crisis state. And this crisis is deepening. Yet at the same time foreign writers, learning of our woes, ask in surprise: "Don't you have any paper to print money?"

The situation will begin to improve only when the publishing houses rid themselves of the dictate of Goskomizdat. They must decide for themselves what and how much to print. And they must themselves sell [their publications]. All publishing houses must have their own company

stores, where they can sell the main mass of their books, and where they can really study the demand. The remaining part of the printed copies may be sold, as now, through ordinary stores, or distributed through the "Book by Mail" system. I believe that the ideological and material benefits from minimal transport, the efficiency of output and the effectiveness of advertisement and maximal consideration of the local market will become evident. Of course, they might narrow the sphere of influence of the central publishing houses. However, we must soberly acknowledge that even today such "all-union" influence is at times imagined. For example, the books of our MOLODAYA GVARDIYA ZhZL [Life of Outstanding People] series are not found on the book counters of Irkutsk, because only a limited number reach there. However, we would not object to our Irkutsk colleagues reprinting the MOLODAYA GVARDIYA ZhZL series of books in such a publication volume as would be accepted by the reader. However, this must be under the condition that the author's copyright sign is not mythical, but real. Today we do not get anything if another publishing house reprints our book, even though we have labored over it in the sweat of our brow, so to speak, and they have taken the finished product.

I mentioned Irkutsk, where there is a publishing house. Yet in Penza, for example, there is not, just as there is not in many other oblast cities where before they published local authors, Pushkin and children's literature alike, and there was no need to conduct unlimited press signings, because Pushkin was always on the counter. They did not gouge, and they effectively considered the demand. Life demands that we once again open [these publishing houses]. Maybe not to the degree as in the USA (today there are 22,500 publishing houses there, i.e., tens of times more than in our country). Yet each oblast (at least wherever this will be economically and technically expedient) should have one. You might laugh: "In an empty space?" No, not in an empty space, but on the basis of the local printing houses and entire polygraphy combines.

Here I will allow myself to touch upon circumstances which as yet have not been discussed. I am speaking of the party publication base, which is present in all the oblast cities and certain rayon cities, not to mention the republic centers. The time of glasnost demands that we turn our gaze here too. Unfortunately, it has never been publicized anywhere what the quantitative and qualitative nature of the press pool is in these printing houses, how much paper is sent there, what is published there, and in what volume. Based on personal observations, I must presume that the reserves for book printing there are considerable. Moreover, repeated efforts have been made to open oblast publishing houses based on these reserves. But after verbal consultations the matter came to a halt: the telephone resolutions were synonymous.

About a year or two ago, while attempting to implement the decision of a high institution associated with the opening of a branch of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA in Siberia, we went to Krasnoyarsk, where construction was being completed on a new building of the kray party

printing-house. We were planning to take over the old building. Yet they did not give it to us. Could it be, I thought, that although the press was small, nevertheless even here it was profitable to print vodka tickets (a real fact!).

The CPSU Central Committee Affairs Administration acted nobly in recently handing over the "Rus" sanatorium to veterans of the Afghan war. Yet, proceeding along the path of developing the political system of our society, why not hand over the overwhelming number of local printing houses to the oblast Soviets of People's Deputies, who would orient themselves directly toward the intellectual and spiritual interests of their residents? After all, the deputies have the right to demand that the voters whose interests they represent have not only the food and industrial products which are necessary for a normal life, but also the spiritual values—books.

Evidently today, when the participants in the All-Union Party Conference have so actively supported M. S. Gorbachev's proposal on combining the roles of party and Soviet leadership in a single individual, it will not only be easier to do this, but also more natural from a political and organizational point of view. At least the time has come for people's power to deal directly with the questions of the press and book publication which are directly related to the social-cultural sphere of our life.

In my opinion, the functions of a methodological coordinating center, instead of the huge bureaucratic Goskomizdat, can easily be assumed, for example, by a council

(or association) of publishers. And the Book Institute (which today has little influence on publication practices) must exist for the input of publishing houses, i.e., the organizations which need it, which will give it specific assignments and hold it accountable for their fulfillment. In much the same way, exhibits and fairs must be organized if necessary by pooling resources. We must give the publishing houses the right to themselves, based on their own income, determine the amounts of the author's honorarium and to enter into equal relations with trade organizations within the country and on the foreign market. We might add that the proposed changes will make it possible to finally settle accounts with the authors depending on the number of copies sold. The publishing houses do not need someone to prod them. Life, and not the Goskomizdat order, must force them to install micro-computers in the publishing houses. Not all-union programs which originate in some office, but rather the real demands of the readers must influence the formulation of publication plans.

A book must be simply a book. The Soviets of People's Deputies, the public, artistic and scientific organizations and departments will themselves determine what literature and how much should be printed in the publishing houses under their control. Not to mention the artistic personage, the public prestige of the publishing houses themselves, which are interested more than Goskomizdat in seeing that the Soviet book be mass-published, thematically varied, polygraphically flawless, and...not too expensive.

**Latsis on Role of Stalin's Cult of Personality
in Soviet History**

18300090a Moscow ZNAMYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88
pp 124-178

[Article by Otto Latsis: "The Change"]

[Text] So we have now returned to where we began just over 30 years ago. To our damned questions. Why did we build socialism Stalin's way? And could we have built it otherwise? It is not idle curiosity which is behind this desire to comprehend our past but concern for the present and the future because without having grasped Stalinitis, we will not find safeguards against its repetition, we will not strengthen new generations' confidence in socialism and we will not resurrect its authority in the world. And without this we simply cannot live.

After all, there have been 20 years of suppression of awkward issues. What have they done for us? Has the authority of the socialist idea been strengthened as a result of this silence? No, only weakened. It was our propaganda which remained silent about the bitter truth of our past, it was our scholarship which failed to investigate difficult problems. Foreign propaganda was not silent, foreign historians lost no time. Nor did the Soviet people who did not listen to the foreign voices not accept their ignorance and filled in the vacuum with myths and home-made concepts.

The socialist consciousness of the older generations suffered relatively less. The experience of life of people who had passed through the revolution and civil war, socialist building and the Patriotic War, this experience gave them a perception of the strength of our system. While shaken by the bitter truth in 1956, the majority of people of those generations nonetheless cultivated an understanding that Lenin's ideas and socialism were one thing, Stalinitis, another. But the experience of life had provided those who had come of age in the 1970's and for whom politics was identified merely with the time of stagnation with an entirely different conditioning.

It was at that time, when "ideological purity" was predominant in the press, that a hitherto inconceivable pollution of ideology occurred in actual social life. Monarchical, bourgeois-democratic, chauvinist, nationalist and religious ideas of various stripes, which had rightly once been considered the appurtenance merely of the vestiges of the exploiter classes, spread among the intelligentsia, among workers and peasants and among the descendants of revolutionaries. Not simply spread but became the fashion and testimony to free-thinking. Today the opponents of perestroika like to argue about the damage that has allegedly been done to the foundations of socialism in the time of glasnost and the appearance of "alternative towers" aspiring to destroy our system. There are such "towers," although the "mourners for socialism" like to ascribe to them any criticism of the distortions of past times. There are in

society exponents of antisocialist ideology, but glasnost has merely enabled them to reveal themselves. But they appeared in the years of silence.

Today historians are starting all over again. Starting under worse conditions because 20 years have been lost. Starting under better conditions because the documents of the October 70th anniversary gave science what it needed: not truth in the last instance on all questions but an opportunity to conduct an objective investigation. They are starting from the same questions at which they stopped at the end of the 1950's-start of the 1960's.

And now the first answers are to hand.

Dmitriy Volkogonov has seemingly told his bitter truth. Here are some assessments of Stalin and Stalinitis from his essay in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 9 December 1987: "trampling of humanity"; "crimes"; "inhuman degradation and ordeals"; "monstrous injustice," "no merits justify the inhumanity"; "bitterness" and "methods of a command-bureaucratic style, violence and 'screw-tightening,' the apologist of which was precisely Trotskiy, would be adopted by Stalin"; "he quickly became accustomed to violence"; "liquidation of personal adversaries"; "the terrible inertia of violence"; "saw society as a human aquarium; all in his power"; "was there not alongside his cruelty Stalin's never-diagnosed mental illness?" Such are the assessments. And facts, terrible facts. In the NKVD authorities alone "more than 20,000 honest people fell victim to this orgy of lawlessness."

And after all this: "During the struggle for the new system's survival the purposiveness and political will of the leader were of exceptional significance. Here, perhaps, Stalin had, after Lenin, no equal." Then: "he also had something others lacked." Conclusion: "Under these conditions an alternative of other leaders was improbable."

Really? We recall words from the report "October and Perestroika: the Revolution Continues": "...The cult of personality was not inevitable. It is alien to the nature of socialism, represents a deviation from its fundamental principles and thus is without justification." Yet the statement concerning the absence of "an alternative of other leaders" automatically justifies before history all that Stalin did. However, if it is proved that he should be vindicated, is the conscientious scholar not bound to recognize this? But it is precisely the point that it has not been proved. Purposiveness and political will? Dozens of Lenin's associates possessed these qualities, and it is now clear that any of them would have been better because it is impossible to conceive of anything worse: at all turns of history, at each fork thereof Stalin chose for our people the path of the greatest costs and casualties. Only an incomprehensible logical breakdown could permit some authors to assert that Stalin accelerated our development in some way; all the facts cry out that he held it

up, that he repeatedly cast the country back and that only the extreme exertion of the people's forces and the great sacrifices made it possible to avoid the total loss of the gains of October.

Igor Klyamkin in NOVYY MIR also tries to prove the objective predetermination of Stalin's way of socialist building, but approaches matters more soundly. He deduces the absence of an alternative from an analysis of class forces and the social mentality of the numerically preponderant peasant masses: "Victorious at that time were the strongest, and none other than they could have been because there was at that time no other 'project for the development' of our street capable of competing with collectivization." And further: "The majority of peasants was reconciled to collectivization because it saw the kulak as its enemy. Because it had not had time to become 'bourgeoisified,' was not ready for competitive struggle on the market and had feared its ruinous chaos since prerevolution times even."

There is some truth in this: such qualities were indeed typical of the peasants at that time. This truth very likely prevented the author from seeing that he had given only an incomplete answer to an incomplete question. The analysis here is much more profound and convincing than D. Volkogonov's inasmuch as I. Klyamkin switched from an examination of the attributes of individuals to a description of social strata. But he quietly substituted the question. We are inquiring into why Stalin's line of the building of socialism, Stalin's line in industrialization, collectivization and state and party building was victorious. Why did the ruling party and the leading class in the political respect, and only then, the most populous class at that time—the peasantry—follow Stalin, and not the Bukharin group. Having inadvertently omitted the question of the choice which the party leadership made, I. Klyamkin reduced everything to the peasantry. But nor was this the end of barely perceptible substitutions. Responding directly to the question: did the peasants accept Stalin's collectivization, one would have to answer: no, they did not. The best proof of this being the mass slaughter of the livestock and the cutback in the grain harvest. But recognizing this would have caused the ingeniously built concept to crumble. For this reason the author puts an even narrower question: why did the peasants not revolt, as the emigres had predicted? It is to this incomplete question that the answer quoted above is given. It also is incomplete. A revolt would have required not only a "love" of what was being de-kulakized. It takes a good deal for the peaceful tiller of the soil to venture upon a war in his own home. A habituation to war, political organization, confidence in one's strength and the weakness of the enemy and extreme desperation from hopelessness and from the impossibility of existence under current circumstances are needed. Such a rare combination of conditions existed only in 1920, and there were powerful uprisings at that time. In 1929 there was of all these conditions only hopelessness, but Stalin damped down this also somewhat in good time by the

hypocritical disavowal of the "excesses". In this situation astonishment should have been caused not by the fact that the peasants as a whole did not rise up but that in places they rose up at all.

No, nor was I. Klyamkin's attempt to show that our country received the path which it deserved and that there could have been no other successful. There was another way, there were supporters of another way. Many authors today incline to the view that the path proposed by the N.I. Bukharin group would have secured the accomplishment of the same historic tasks at a price of fewer costs. Thus L. Gordon and E. Klopov (ZNA-NIYE-SILA No 2, 1988) writes: "The experience of real socialism—both in the USSR and in other countries—points to the possibility in principle of the building of socialism within the framework of a policy close to that proposed by the opponents of I.V. Stalin."

There was another way. Why, then, did it remain only a possibility? A complete answer to this very important and far from academic question would take much labor, including the study of documents as yet unread. But some conjectures may be expressed even now. They are connected with a description not of the peasantry but of the working class and the leadership of this party after Lenin.

I

An individual personality can change hardly anything at times of a sharp imbalance in social forces and a considerable preponderance of one force. No influence of a single personality, probably, could have stopped the people's uprising against the Provisional Government at the end of 1917, after it had shown its inability and reluctance to give that for which February had been accomplished: land to the peasants, bread to the workers and peace to the peoples. This was shown particularly clearly by what happened to Kamenev and Zinovyev, whose personal authority had been great. But so strong was the mass pressure that the most authoritative personalities who failed to come to terms with it found themselves isolated. The majority against them in the Central Committee was so decisive that we have a right to assume that had it been the case that Lenin had altogether been unable for some reason to influence this decision, Kamenev and Zinovyev would still not have gained a majority. And had they done so, had the Bolsheviks stood aside, this would merely have left the field open for the left SR's and for the anarchists or other political forces, but would not have stopped the uprising.

It is a different matter when two contending trends with strong social support on both sides, so that the scales are roughly in balance, clash. A jolt of one personality even is sufficient for one cup to outweigh the other. This was the case in the question of the Brest peace. Let us assume for a moment that at this time Lenin once again had owing to some confluence of circumstances been unable to participate in the decision. At that time, perhaps,

without the resistance of this sole personality—Lenin—the opponents of peace would have been victorious in the party. After all, they had been in the majority in the Central Committee for some time, and even all of Lenin's authority, immense energy and strength of conviction against it had not been enough. More time, which cost a deterioration in the peace terms, and the threat of resignation at the congress (to which Lenin never again resorted and which produced several votes) were needed. It was precisely an individual, having adopted the correct stance and having applied all its capabilities, who saved the day.

The state of not very steady balance—and not for the moment, what is more, but for a lengthy period—inevitably created also the plan for the transition to socialism called the new economic policy. For decades—right up to the formation of the new working class—the peasant masses, which by no means recognized their interest in a socialist future, had remained predominant in the country. True, state power was in the hands of the working class, but even it would not have secured a preponderance had it been used for a policy of suppressing the peasants—only a policy of alliance was possible. In the long term this meant inevitable petty bourgeois influence on the workers themselves. Avoiding the dangers connected with this was possible only given complete unity among the “personalities”—the upper stratum of the party. As of this time there had been an extraordinary increase in the role not of millions but of thousands—Bolsheviks going back to before the revolution—and individuals even—the party leaders.

How to live until the time when a powerful stratum of workers had taken shape? How to avoid degeneration and other dangers? After all, the small peasant farm was engendering capitalism “by the day, by the hour”. And the thin stratum of workers had after the war become even thinner. Who would preserve it against all-penetrating petty bourgeois influence? There was only one answer: the party. But who would preserve the party? At the 11th congress, the last attended by Lenin, a report on party building was a special item on the agenda. It adduced the following figure: Bolsheviks with a length of service going back to before 1917 constituted 2 percent of the party. This was after a purge which had reduced the party by one-fourth at the expense of newly fledged communists.

Two percent, but steadfast people with tremendous political experience who occupied all the positions in the party and the state. They had to keep the locomotive of the revolution on track on the most difficult stage. Only after this could the role of a personality or several personalities, on whom the success of the entire cause depended, be reduced to normal limits. Was such a task within the powers of several thousand people—the party's upper stratum? It was, if only they did not impede one another. Whence the concern for unity throughout 1923 and in all Lenin's last works. Whence the “testament”—the endeavor to closely scrutinize the

upper stratum itself, on which all would depend. We recall the names of the six leaders. The “Letter to the Congress” named Trotskiy, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinovyev, Bukharin, Pyatakov.

Just 4 years later Trotskiy was in exile, and Kamenev, Zinovyev and Pyatakov had been expelled from the party; a further 2 years later Trotskiy was expelled from the country, and Bukharin had been deprived of any significant power. Stalin had not been opposed by any of the old leaders. His power had become exclusive even at that time, at the end of the 1920's. The repression of the 1930's did not signify Stalin's seizure of power—they signified only a strengthening of power which had been seized earlier. The shadow of possible competition was removed at that time. How, on the other hand, were the actual competitors removed?

The most dramatic engagement, in which the last of Stalin's competitors in the six was defeated, was the struggle against the right deviation, which began following the 15th congress (December 1927) and was over by the 16th congress (1930). This period is of interest not only in that it signified the actual seizure of unlimited power. And not only for the power of the vanquished opponents (Bukharin was a member of the Politburo, leader of the Comintern, editor of PRAVDA and most prominent theorist and favorite of the party, Rykov was a member of the Politburo, chairman of the Sovnarkom and thus Lenin's immediate successor in terms of office, and Tomskiy was a member of the Politburo in Lenin's time even and chairman of the AUCCTU). The order of battle in this engagement was interesting also.

We recall that the first of the six to be vanquished—Trotskiy—had himself attacked the Politburo and the Central Committee. He was so self-confident and was so truly important a figure thanks to his services in the two revolutions and the recently ended civil war that he not only moved alone against all the other leaders but also against party policy, which had been formulated at a congress when Lenin was still alive even and which had been pursued by the Central Committee unanimously. Trotskiy threw his personal authority into the balance—and was smashed. His chief opponents were, among others, Zinovyev and Kamenev.

Their turn came 18 months later, they went against Stalin and Bukharin, who headed a majority of the Central Committee. Again the initiative emanated from members of the opposition, they choosing as the formal target (it was awkward proposing simply changes in the leadership) party policy on the basic socioeconomic issues formulated unanimously at the preceding congress, conference and plenums—and were smashed. They then joined with Trotskiy, at whom they themselves had previously struck—this was already a manifestly lost cause, and by the 15th congress all three had been ejected from the Politburo, then from the Central Committee and, finally, from the party (like Pyatakov, who had held less significant positions).

But Bukharin had not formed an opposition, and it was not without reason that the word "deviation" was employed in respect of him. Bukharin was not opposed to party policy, on the contrary, he defended the decisions of the last congress. Attacking his position meant attacking the general line of the party. Hitherto everyone who had done so had suffered defeat. But Stalin succeeded in changing the general line itself between congresses and pulling it from under the feet of Bukharin, who held to his former positions.

From 1923, when Lenin departed the country's leadership, through the end of 1927, including the 15th congress, Stalin invariably held to a posture of firm defense of the new economic policy begun by Lenin. The struggle was keen and difficult, the rivals, very strong, but Stalin and Bukharin—two of the six—always held to Leninist positions, and whereas it was noticed of Bukharin that he made certain mistakes in the course of defense of these positions, for which he was criticized and which he had to acknowledge, mistakes by Stalin at this time were not noticed. He was like a rock, seemingly, having left behind all hesitation and mistakes in the period of the past when Lenin was alive, who could put anyone right. All the more stunning was his turnabout in 1928.

The main issues of the clash with the "right deviationists" were the paths and pace of industrialization (which was reduced mainly to a discussion of the quotas of the First Five-Year Plan) and the paths and pace of collectivization. At the start of 1929 the Gosplan proposed to the Sovnarkom two versions, which were not counterposed politically since they reflected one and the same approach—the difference was merely in the degree of tautness. One of these versions, called the optimum, was higher than the other, called the initial, by approximately 20 percent. That is, per the optimum the same indicators could be achieved in 5 years which per the initial version could be achieved in 6.

Initially Gosplan Chairman Krzhizhanovskiy did not assume responsibility for the optimum version and explained in his speeches that the two versions of the plan were an artillery bracket, as it were, so that a "hit" in plan fulfillment would be within its range. He believed that the initial version would be fulfilled unconditionally, and were we, in addition, taking the optimum version as the reference point, to surge ahead in individual sectors, this also would be useful.

However, subsequently even the very name of the initial version was employed increasingly infrequently, it being termed "minimal," opportunist, inimical and so forth. Following the first study the Sovnarkom began to recommend only the optimum version. The optimum version was adopted without argument by the 16th Party Conference in April 1929 on the basis of the reports of Rykov, Krzhizhanovskiy and Kuybyshev, chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), which were uniform in spirit. Then on the basis of the conference's decision the Fifth Congress of

Soviets of the USSR adopted the 5-year plan. However, this was not the end of the story of the plan. First, a series of decrees of the party Central Committee, the Sovnarkom and the USSR Central Executive Committee raised the indicators for certain sectors—pig iron, oil, tractors, farm machinery, electrification of the railroads (the increase in the pig iron quota was noted specially in the resolution of the 16th party congress). Second, the "5-Year Plan in 4 Years" slogan was advanced. This became the generally recognized goal, but subsequently it was resolved to exceed even this. Reporting at a USSR Central Executive Committee session on the control figures for 1931, Molotov said that an increase in industrial output of 45 percent was scheduled instead of the 22 percent envisaged by the 5-year plan for the third year of the plan. And a month later Stalin explained in a speech at the first conference of industrial workers in February 1931 that fulfillment of this annual quota would mean fulfillment of the 5-year plan in 3 years in respect of the main sectors. The decision had appeared by that time to shift the start of the economic year to 1 January. And in January 1933 a joint plenum of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee and Central Control Commission announced that the 5-year plan had been fulfilled in 4 years 3 months. Thus whereas per the plan the accounting year of the 5-year plan should have been the 1932/33 economic year (from 1 October through 1 October), it was actually the 1932 calendar year.

The quantitative results of the development of industry in the First Five-Year Plan cannot be evaluated in one or two words. It is known from popular primers that it was fulfilled successfully in 4 years 3 months. There is somewhat more infrequent mention that it was fulfilled in terms of the gross industrial product 93.7 percent. This is not fulfillment exactly but, considering the abridged timeframe, a good result. However, the interpretation of the gross product indicators requires certain caution. Their significance cannot be downplayed but nor should they be exaggerated. First, it is difficult for us to determine to what extent the growth of wholesale prices which occurred in the 5-year plan, to which Soviet economic literature points quite conclusively, was reflected in these indicators. Second (and this could be more important), the cost estimate of the output volume is by nature conditional, particularly given the unprecedented break with the structure of production which occurred at that time. Entire vast sectors which had not existed in 1928 were producing output in 1932: automotive, tractor, aviation, agricultural machine-building, petrochemical. It is known that it was the mechanical engineering product, the production of equipment and machine tools particularly, which exerted a big influence on the summary figure of the gross product of all industry. What does a comparison of the indices incorporating the product of these sectors with those of the time when they did not exist tell us? Mainly that the aircraft as a sum total of gross product is greater than a cart. But we need to remember the conditional nature of gross indicators given a quantitative evaluation: how

much the country's gross product had increased if 100 aircraft were produced instead of 100 carts. Yet the very nature of the question (how the plan was fulfilled) requires precisely an accurate quantitative estimate. For a reliable and complete answer to this question we need to employ not only cost but also physical indicators in respect of the most important sectors.

Let us examine as an example the vicissitudes of the pig iron plan. This is not our choice: it was pig iron which figured in first place in the political disputes of that time among the other sectoral indicators. Metal was the symbol of industrial power, and in a country which had not accumulated metal stocks it was pig iron which determined the possibilities of metallurgy. The initial version proposed the smelting in the final year of the 5-year plan of 7 million tons of pig iron, the optimum (meaning, the plan confirmed originally), 10 million, the upgraded quota of the 16th congress, 17 million. Some 6.2 million tons were actually smelted in 1932. Compared with the 3.3 million tons in 1928 this was a brilliant success, without precedent in the world, but it by no means confirmed that Stalin was right in the argument concerning the frontiers of the 5-year plan, on the contrary, the result was close to the initial version.

It was the same with all the other physical indicators. The 5-year plan had scheduled an increase in tractor production to 53,000, the upgraded quota, to 170,000, and the actual result was 49,000. The corresponding indicators for motor vehicles were 100,000, 200,000 and 24,000. Some 13.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power were generated in 1932 as against the 22 billion per the 5-year plan, 900,000 tons of mineral fertilizer instead of 8 million tons. Fulfillment was recorded only where the indicators were cost indicators—in general and agricultural machine building.

Does this mean nonfulfillment of the basic indicators and that the optimum and even the initial versions were impracticable? Hardly. Having studied the progress of the 5-year plan by year, it may be assumed with a great degree of confidence that, if not complete fulfillment of the optimum plan, a hit in the "bracket" between it and the initial version was perfectly possible (in respect of the basic indicators of volume of industrial output—judging qualitative indicators of industry and other plan targets is more complicated). Even the most general analysis shows that the course of the 5-year plan was interrupted following the start thereof by the abrupt jolts toward acceleration compared with the optimum version—which was taut enough as it was. The slogans of plan fulfillment in 4 and in 3 years even and the attempted forcible acceleration at the start and in the middle of the 5-year plan led to disproportions, the disruption of plan conformity and ultimately to a drop in pace at the end of the 5-year plan, which continued at the start of the Second Five-Year Plan also. The overall outcome of the prewar development of industry—compared, to judge from experience, with what could have been produced by plan-oriented, proportional development—this overall

outcome was undoubtedly reduced by the leap forward with the subsequent slump for the slump showed a greater deviation from the average figures than the leap forward.

The initial version proposed high, but gradually diminishing annual increases in industrial output—from a 21.4-percent increase in the first year of the 5-year plan to 17.4 percent in fifth. This was in keeping with the objective growth trends at that time. The optimum version prescribed a gradual growth—from 21.4 percent to 25.2 percent. But as of the second year a spurring forward began in the annual plans, which produced no real acceleration but disorganized production. Instead of the decreed increase of 31.3 percent, the actual increase in 1930 amounted to 22 percent. Fortyfive percent was planned for the third year, the result was 20.5 percent. For the fourth plan, 36 percent, in fact, 14.7 percent. An uncontrollable slump began which lowered the 1933 increase to 5.5 percent—unprecedentedly little for those times. But Stalin had already declared the 5-year plan fulfilled, and the fifth year was left out of it and did not spoil the picture of victories.

The mechanism of such disruptions is well known. The possibility of a volitional change in pace is limited by available resources. Clearly, if with material for one plant, one begins to build two, neither will be built. So it was with metallurgy. When the 5-year plan pig iron quota was raised from 10 million tons to 17 million, the sector was overstrained. The year of the highest rate according to the plan—1931—in fact showed a reduction in the smelting of both pig iron and steel. Then slow growth followed, so we moved from 5 million tons in 1930 to merely 7.1 million in 1933. And then all at once a leap forward to 10.4 million in 1934, when the speedup trends had ceased to exist and such leaps forward were not required of industry. It was the augmented process stock which had been formed when many new construction projects had been established all at once which had come into play here. And although the date of the smelting of the originally planned 10 million tons (sixth year after the start of the First Five-Year Plan) speaks in support of the initial version, seemingly, the optimum plan also would have been realistic, possibly, had it not been for the even greater acceleration.

In his speech "Tasks of the Industrial Executives," which advanced the slogan of fulfillment of the 5-year plan in 3 years and justified the figure of a 45-percent increase in industrial output for 1931, Stalin inquired: "Do we have every opportunity necessary for fulfilling the control figures for 1931?" And replied: "Yes, we do." In his customary style—point by point—he went on to analyze these opportunities: natural resources; authorities "which have the desire and strength to set in motion the use of these tremendous natural resources for the good of the people"; the support for these authorities of the worker-peasant masses; a system which is free of the incurable ailments of capitalism; a cohesive and united

party. "Thus we have, comrades, all the objective opportunities which will facilitate our accomplishment of the 1931 control figures and which will help us fulfill the 5-year plan in 4, and in the decisive sectors, in 3 years even."

No doubt, all these conditions did in reality exist. But mentioning them would have been necessary (and sufficient) had it been a question, let us suppose, of the possibility of industrialization in principle. But it was a question of a specific economic task, and nobody could explain in what way the task of raising industrial output in 1931 by precisely 45 percent, and not 44 or 46, not 10 or 100 percent, ensued from the existence of the Soviet state and Bolshevik Party supported by the millions-strong masses. The conditions enumerated by Stalin were in principle absolutely essential for socialist building. But they were far from "all" the conditions, as he said, necessary for tackling the specific economic task. Also necessary here were such additional trifles as nails and boards, bricks and iron and cement and glass, and necessary, what is more, in a particular quantity and particular quality, by a particular date and for a particular price—only on the basis of such an analysis may we speak of the practicability of a specific figure of increase. Stalin scorned such prosaic matters.

But not everyone could so airily dismiss life's trifling matters. In February the industrial executives had applauded Stalin, and in April the VSNKh divided up among the biggest industrial associations allocations for cement and lumber for the current year. It was a question of the Steel, Coal, Soyuzneft, Soyuzsredmash, Soyuzselmash, Parvagdiz and other associations of similar dimensions. The association which was the luckiest obtained 84.4 percent of the requisite cement and 71.7 percent of the lumber. The Soyuzselmash, little more than half the cement and less than half the lumber which it required, and textile industry, 31 and 23.6 percent respectively.

It is not hard to understand that the failure of the second half of the 5-year plan was explained precisely by the reckless disregard for the material aspect. Given this strain and lack of reserves, failure in one place was followed by a chain reaction, and one disproportion entailed another.

Later Ordzhonikidze spoke of the shortcomings in the organization of the work of metallurgy at that time. Magnesite was hauled to the southern plants from the Urals, although it was available in the Ukraine. Firebrick was purchased abroad, the country possessing fire clay. Such were the inevitable costs of the race for growth at any price.

All this was reflected in qualitative indicators, primarily in prime costs and, consequently, in profits, and on their total depended everything, the whole plan, inasmuch as

a cornerstone of industrialization was the hope of intrinsic accumulation. The average annual numbers of workers and employees in the national economy in 4 years of the 5-year plan doubled and had in 1932 reached 22.9 million instead of the planned 15.8 million. This surplus made it possible to compensate for the disproportions and plug many holes in the economy, but surplus millions of working people in themselves represent a disproportion capable of rattling the entire national economic organism. So it did.

Although productivity in industry grew in the 5-year plan only 41 percent (a growth of 110 percent had been planned), average wages in this time doubled (but the plan had provided for a growth thereof by a factor of less than 1.5). Inasmuch as the numbers of workers and employees had doubled also, total wages, consequently, grew fourfold, although the plan had not envisaged this. But the production of consumer goods grew, on the contrary, more slowly than scheduled. The movement of another most important proportion: correlation of the money supply and the commodity supply, was thus not plan-based but chaotic. The natural consequence was a rapid growth of retail prices, which replaced the low-prices policy which had been pursued up to 1928. Yet the plan had envisaged (and Stalin had repeatedly promised) a growth of the living standard. The economic-planning authorities endeavored by plan means to hold back the growth of prices, and they rose not as rapidly as was required for maintaining market equilibrium. A most important gain of the NEP times—the strong, reliably backed ruble (it has not returned yet)—crumbled. Commodity starvation began. A retail trade rationing system was imposed in the year which launched the First Five-Year Plan—it was abolished 2 years after the 5-year plan. This was the sole occasion in Soviet history when a rationing system has been introduced in the country as a whole in peacetime. Since it has become a question of rationing, in accordance with which food (but not only food) was allocated primarily, we should turn to the development of agriculture in the 5-year plan.

We would note that information on the gross harvest and yield of the main agricultural crops of the start of the 1930's was not published in statistical digests for more than 50 years and appeared only in the "National Economy of the USSR" yearbook published in 1987. Reporting this information was embarrassing. After all, all these years the rod-driven collectivization—Stalinist instead of Leninist—was justified by the need to overcome the grain difficulties. This is how they were overcome. The gross cereals harvest in 1932 amounted to 69.9 million tons instead of the planned 105.8 million and the 73.3 million tons obtained in 1928. The sugar beet harvest in the 4 years had fallen from 10.1 million to 6.6 million tons. The number of horses declined from 32.1 million to 21.7 million (and an increase therein had been planned). The head of cattle declined from 60.1 million to 38.3 million (the 5-year plan had contained the figure of 80.9 million). The numbers of hogs and

sheep declined more than twofold. The production of milk, meat, wool and eggs fell sharply (by a factor of 1.5-2).

It was only at the time of compilation of the 5-year plan, incidentally, that great attention was paid to indicators of the development of agricultural production. But in subsequent documents the main attention was concentrated on a single indicator: the level of collectivization. The 5-year plan provided for approximately 20 percent of farms to be encompassed by collectivization. This target was exceeded in the first year of the 5-year plan even, and by the end of it collectivization had been completed, in the main, in the most important agricultural areas. Thus in agriculture the response to "speedup" was distinctive. The indicator which people tried to "accelerate" directly—the percentage of collectivization—indeed grew rapidly. But there was a simultaneous deterioration in that for which an acceleration of collectivization had been sought—production. The end did not justify the dreadful means, it was exploded by them.

Why did it turn out this way? Was all this a surprise and theoretically unforeseen? And if the harm of speedup had been foreseen, who urged it on and why? Let us turn to the documents.

In April 1923 the 12th party congress—the first at which Lenin was not present, but whose work he observed—recorded in the resolution on the Central Committee report:

"The even closer link of the city with the peasantry constituting the vast majority of Russia's population, comprehensive service of the countryside by progressive workers led by our party, the extensive organization of sponsorship and such, a cautious policy considering the peasantry's actual ability to pay when levying taxes—these are the fundamental practical issues confronting the party in the coming period. In close connection with this is a most important political task of the party determining the entire outcome of the revolution: preserving and developing with the greatest attention and care the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. It is from this viewpoint that the party should approach a solution of all most important immediate problems, not losing sight of the fact that the relative significance of state industry throughout the country's economy may be increased only gradually and only given the party's constant and systematic work on an improvement in the organization of industry, an increase in its profitability and so forth."

"Cautious policy" (for the countryside), "only gradually" (for industry)—such definitions were characteristic.

The congress resolution "Tax Policy in the Countryside" envisaged a new step in extension of the NEP: transition from tax in kind to monetary tax, which "will alleviate

the position of the peasantry and will benefit the peasant economy not only by the reduction in tax payment costs but also in that it will afford the peasant an opportunity to freely accommodate himself to the market...."

May 1924. The 13th congress confirmed the decisions of the 13th party conference, which rejected Trotsky's criticism of the party's economic policy elaborated by the 10th, 11th and 12th congresses. Then the 14th party conference (April 1925) charted an essential change—not toward a weakening but a strengthening of NEP principles, primarily in relations with the peasantry. The conference demanded the eradication of the vestiges of war communism in tax policy and administrative practice. The task set was that of a strengthening of the worker-peasant alliance and the dictatorship of the proletariat "on the basis of the new relations and the new methods ensuing from these new developing relations."

The conference proposed the use of additional resources for extending credit and assistance to the bulk of the peasantry, adopted a decision on easing the terms of the use of wage labor in agriculture and the short-term leasing of land (the purpose of this was to use the population surplus) and granted "all strata of the population employed in agriculture" the right to participate in the cooperative system. The latter signified admittance to the cooperative system of the kulaks, and with a vote, what is more, but proposed the insertion in the rules of the cooperative organizations restrictions guaranteeing nonadmittance of "manifestly kulak elements" to the associations' board. The conference demanded completely free elections to the cooperative bodies and warned the party and soviet authorities locally against administrative interference in cooperative work.

A few months later the economic policy confirmed by the 14th party conference came under attack from the "new opposition" at the 14th congress. The postwar restoration of the economy had been completed by this time, and for this reason the congress was faced with the task of by far from just answering the opposition—it was necessary to chart the line of industrialization and the socialist restructuring of the entire economy. By what methods should this work be performed?

The congress noted in the main resolution: "The economic offensive of the proletariat based on the new economic policy is going forward." It is important to emphasize this: since it was an offensive, the economic innovations adopted in the countryside in this period were not, consequently, sorrowfully forced concessions, which would be revoked at the first opportunity, but part of the permanent principles of policy.

The congress, further, set the following task: "...maintaining course toward the country's industrialization, development of the production of producer goods and formation of reserves for economic maneuver..." and "developing our socialist industry on the basis of an upgraded engineering level, strictly in

accordance, however, both with the capacity of the market and with the state's financial possibilities...." This resolution has gone down in history as the first party document which put industrialization in the immediate, present-day concerns category. It is important to concentrate attention on this: it was not the 15th or, even less, the 16th but the 14th congress which marked the change from restoration to industrialization, and had the very logic of this change required a transition from proportional development to speedup, this 14th congress would have to have proclaimed such a new approach. But nothing of the sort happened here. Granted all the conciseness of the instructions quoted, the principle of approach is not in doubt—strict balance and plan-conformity and secure reserves. There is essentially a direct warning against intensive or overhasty plans here.

Concerning work in the countryside, the congress condemned two deviations: on the one hand underestimation of the struggle against the kulak, on the other, overestimation of this struggle glossing over "the main question of communist policy in the countryside, the question of struggle for the middle peasant as the central figure in farming and of the cooperative system as the main organizational form of the countryside's movement toward socialism.

"The congress emphasizes particularly the need to combat this last deviation. Granted the party's relatively great preparedness for direct struggle against the kulak and for overcoming the first deviation, a far more difficult task is that of overcoming the second deviation for getting the better of it requires more complex methods of struggle to combine methods of the political isolation of the kulaks with methods of the enlistment of the bulk of the peasantry in the channel of socialist building. The more so in that under the present conditions this second deviation threatens a return to the policy of de-kulakization and frustration of the present party line in the countryside, a line which has already secured considerable political successes, frustration of the union between the proletariat and the peasantry and, consequently, frustration of our entire work of construction."

Just so!

The congress approved the decisions of the 14th party conference on the peasant question, pointing out that "just this change in party policy ensuing from the changed relations between the classes has fundamentally improved the situation in the countryside...." It was with good reason that the resolution mentioned an improvement in the situation: prior to the conference there had been peasant uprisings, and they were discussed at the congress by the speakers, including Stalin in the main report.

At the end of 1926 the 15th party conference adopted the resolution "The Country's Economic Situation and the Party's Tasks," which devoted the first section entirely to the question into which we are inquiring. It is called "Period of Restructuring of the Economy on a New

Technical Basis and the Pace of Industrialization". We read here:

"The conference categorically condemns the opposition's views concerning the need to pursue industrialization by way of a taxation of the countryside and a price policy which would inevitably lead to a halting of the development of agriculture and reduce the sources of raw material for industry and the market for its products, which would inevitably lead to a sharp fall in the pace of the country's industrialization."

We could quote many other documents confirming the permanency over a number of years of the economic policy line which had been laid down, as of the 10th party congress, by Lenin—a line counterposing to all leaps forward and "hysterical impulses" the "measured tread of the iron battalions of the proletariat." But the most significant document in this category, a document which imbibed both the achievements of economic theory and the practical experience of economic building in the 10 years of Soviet power, were the directives of the 15th party congress pertaining to compilation of the First Five-Year Plan adopted in December 1927. They still serve in economic science as an example of the comprehensive elaboration of the problem of production efficiency. The correlation of consumption and accumulation, industry and agriculture, the production of producer goods and production of consumer goods, in short, all the basic national economic proportions, is examined here in a few pages. And on no question was there a disturbance of balance and excessive enthusiasm for one aspect of a proportion to the detriment of another.

It is difficult quoting this document, there being little point in examining individual propositions—it needs to be apprehended in its entirety. We shall adduce just one short example—to describe the actual approach to the solution of problems. The directives say: "On the question of the rate of development it is necessary equally to keep in mind the extreme complexity of the task. It is necessary to proceed here not from the maximum rate of accumulation for the coming year or several years but from a correlation of components of the economy which ensure the speediest rate of development for a long time."

How long even after this the widespread and irrepressible allure of the leap forward resolving all problems at a stroke continued! In what incomprehensible ways in dreams about a leap forward was its very duration standardized (Stalin demanded fulfillment of the 5-year plan in 3 years, Khrushchev dreamed of overtaking America in animal husbandry in 2-3 years, Mao planned the first Great Leap Forward in 3 years)! And how clearly the party had set the task just several months prior to the first attempted leap forward in the history of socialist building: "the speediest rate of development for a long time." This rules out the assumption that the disastrous nature of a leap forward could not have been known ahead of time, before the first experiment. Such attempts

were known about and renounced. Consequently, Stalin—and he alone had the strength and authority for this—consciously ignored this knowledge.

But Stalin had perhaps been a supporter of speedup earlier also and had been prevented from implementing his idea? Let us see what he himself said.

1921. Stalin wrote about economic building in the article "The Party Before and After the Seizure of Power": "This process will undoubtedly be slow and painful, but it is inevitable and inexorable and will not cease to be an inevitability because some impatient comrades become nervous, demanding rapid results and effective operations."

1924, "Fundamentals of Leninism":

"It hardly needs to be proved that there is not the slightest possibility of accomplishing these tasks quickly and implementing all this in a few years" (this applies to the basic tasks of socialist building. How can we fail to recall here the celebrated dictum of the times of the 5-year plan: either we cover this distance in a few years or we will be crushed).

1925, the report "Results of the Work of the 14th Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Conference":

"Proceeding from the fact of differentiation of the countryside, some comrades are concluding that the party's main task is to incite class struggle in the countryside. This, comrades, is wrong. It is idle prattle. It is not this which is now our main task. It is a rehash of the old Menshevik songs from the old Menshevik songbook. The main thing now is by no means inciting class struggle in the countryside. The main thing now is to rally the middle peasants around the proletariat and win them over anew. The main thing now is to join with the bulk of the peasantry, raise its material and cultural level and move forward together with it along the path leading to socialism."

Further:

"But how to include the peasant economy in the system of economic building? Through the cooperative system. Through credit cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives, consumers' cooperatives and producers' cooperatives. Such are the roads and paths by which the peasant economy should slowly, but surely be incorporated in the overall system of socialist building."

Just so: "slowly, but surely"! And, further:

"It is essential that the communists in the countryside renounce abnormal forms of administrative rule. We cannot make use merely of some rulings in respect of the peasantry. We need to learn to patiently explain to the peasants issues which they do not understand and to learn to persuade the peasants, sparing neither time nor effort in this work."

And in his closing remarks at the 14th congress Stalin made it plainly understood that nor should unity with the middle peasant against the kulak be understood as a declaration of war on the kulak. This is what he said apropos the proposition concerning an understanding with the middle peasant contained in Larin's book:

"It is right that he makes the reservation in his book about this, maintaining that neutralization is insufficient for us and that we need to take a 'step further' toward an 'understanding with the middle peasant against the kulak'. But here, unfortunately, Comrade Larin takes the edge off his idea of a 'second revolution' against the domination of the kulak, which we do not share, which brings him close to Comrade Zinovyev and which compels me to dissociate myself from him somewhat."

A little later, 3-4 years on, it might be very appropriate to recall that Stalin did dissociate himself from such a "second revolution," and not just anywhere but at the congress which supported him against the opposition.

The year of 1925 altogether provided a multitude of corroborative instances of the fact that the new line in the countryside had been drawn up by the Central Committee's Stalin majority (specifically by the Motolov Commission) not as a short-term tactical step but soundly, as policy in earnest and for a long time. Take Stalin's "Questions and Answers"—the June speech at Sverdlovsk University. The question could not have been put to him more directly: "How to conduct the struggle against the kulaks without inciting class struggle?" Answering, Stalin showed convincingly that class contradictions could and should be resolved without inciting class struggle. Specifically, concerning the struggle against kulak profiteering prices:

"Neither here are we concerned to incite class struggle... we perfectly well can and must avoid the incitement of struggle here and the complications associated with it." How? The answer was convincing: "We can and must keep at the state's disposal sufficient food reserves necessary for squeezing the food market, intervening where necessary, maintaining prices at a level acceptable to the working masses and thus foiling the profiteering machinations of the kulaks."

The successes of this policy were subsequently reported: low bread prices had been maintained, and the kulak had been forced in a number of areas to capitulate and put onto the market grain stocks at low prices.

From the report to the 14th congress:

"We should give the poor the password in order that they might, finally, stand on their own feet and with the assistance of the Communist Party and the state organize themselves into groups and learn in the arena of the soviets, in the arena of the cooperatives, in the arena of the peasant committees and in all arenas of the rural community to struggle against the kulak, but struggle not

by way of an appeal to the GPU but by way of political struggle, by way of organized struggle. Only thus can the poor be conditioned, only thus can the poor be organized and only thus can a support of the proletariat in the countryside instead of a dependent group be formed from the rural poor."

The wording of the same report in respect of industry leaves no doubt as to whom the corresponding phrases in the congress resolution belong: "Twice the amount of appropriations for the development of industry could be authorized, but this would be a rapid rate of industry's development which we could not sustain in view of the great shortage of spare capital and on the basis of which we would surely fail...." And, further: "in the future our industry will in all probability not develop at such a rapid pace as it has developed up to now." Stalin dinned it in insistently: "...we must build with reserves, we need reserves which could cover our deficiencies... we need to grasp the idea of the need to build up reserves." Very well, we will remember this word: reserves.

1926. The first year of industrialization, the first year of the development of industry under new conditions fundamentally different from those of the period of restoration. Had Stalin's position changed? Not one iota. From his report "The Economic Position of the Soviet Union and Party Policy":

"The same should be said about the rate of our accumulation, about the reserves at our disposal for the development of our industry. We sometimes like to construct fantastic industrial plans without taking stock of our resources. People sometimes forget that neither industrial plans nor this 'wide-ranging' and 'all-embracing' enterprise or other can be constructed without a certain minimum of assets, without a certain minimum of reserves. They forget and race ahead." And, further: "A command staff in the army which becomes divorced from its army and loses touch with it is not a command staff. Equally, industry divorced from the national economy as a whole and losing touch with it cannot be the guiding principle of the national economy."

In the report at the 15th Party Conference (November 1926) Stalin said that the opposition bloc was "sliding... onto the path of 'superhuman' jumps and 'heroic' incursions into the sphere of the objective course of things. Whence... the demand for our country's industrialization in 6 months virtually and so forth. Whence the recklessness in the policy of the opposition bloc. Particular significance is attached in this connection to the opposition bloc's theory (it is in fact the theory of Trotskyism) on the leapfrogging of the peasantry with us, in our country, in the matter of our country's industrialization...."

The same report sounded one further note, which was repeated persistently in various speeches:

"Comrade Trotsky evidently does not recognize the proposition that industrialization with us may be developed

only via a gradual improvement in the material situation of the toiling masses of the countryside.... Whence the practical proposals of the opposition bloc as regards the raising of transfer prices, tax pressure on the peasantry and so forth, proposals leading not a strengthening of economic cooperation between the proletariat and the peasantry but to its breakdown...."

In a discussion with foreign worker delegations (5 November 1927) Stalin was asked: "How do you intend to implement collectivism in the peasant question?" He replied:

"We intend implementing collectivism in agriculture gradually, with measures of an economic, financial and cultural-political nature."

Stalin went on to show that in the supply to the countryside of various industrial commodities the share of the cooperatives and state trade had reached 70-100 percent, in the purchase of peasant grain, over 80 percent, and in the purchase of raw material for industry, almost 100 percent. The state plan principle had thereby already been introduced in agriculture. The extent of the production, prices and quality of cotton, sugar beet and so forth were determined by way of forward contracting by state syndicates, and not the play of forces on an unorganized market. Stalin concluded: "...it may confidently be said that all sectors of agriculture, not excluding grain production, will gradually switch to this path of development. And this path is a direct approach to the collectivization of agriculture." But as far as "all-embracing collectivization" was concerned, "things have not come to this yet and will not come soon. Why? Because, incidentally, immense finances which our state does not yet have but which will undoubtedly accumulate in time are needed for this."

He was no less circumspect about industrialization also at that time. His position in the report at the 15th party congress (December) is almost faultless. Stalin initially adduced figures of the increase in the product of large-scale nationalized industry in the past 3 years: 42.2 percent, 18.2 percent and 15.8 percent. Then, the Gosplan rough outlines of the 5-year plan: average annual increase in the product of large-scale industry, 15 percent, total industry, 12 percent. There followed a comparison with the American rate (from 2.6 to 8.2 percent) and the prerevolution Russian rate (10.7 percent in the best years). Conclusion: "The percentage annual increase in the product of our socialist industry and also the product of all industry is a record beyond that of any major capitalist country in the world."

There is not a word in the congress resolution on Stalin's report about an increase in pace, the words "continue at an unflagging pace" are used in respect of industrialization and the problem of the accumulation of commodity and currency reserves is highlighted. And the congress

directives emphasize that "the central problem of industry," to whose solution all other tasks must be subordinated, is a reduction in prime costs—quantitative tasks on a secondary level. The wording of the directives concerning the tempo, which not only does not demand an immediate increase therein but virtually cautions against this, has been quoted above.

The tasks of rural work are examined in Stalin's report at the congress in the spirit of the point expounded above of the discussion with foreign workers. One detail merits attention: "The comrades who believe that it is possible and necessary to have done with the kulak by way of administrative measures, via the GPU: signed, sealed and settled, are wrong. This is a facile, but far from efficacious weapon. The kulak needs to be overcome by measures of an economic nature and on the basis of Soviet legality." Let us remember the date: this was said in December 1927.

This congress was rich in events, wise and optimistic. It put behind it the period of the first successes of socialist building and confidently planned further progress. It liberated itself from the opposition bloc, whose participants had in various combinations been tormenting the party for more than 4 years, beginning with Trotsky's speech in 1923. Everyone had become sick of the trouble with the opposition, everyone wanted to work calmly and get down to building a new life. Everyone voted with a sense of relief for the expulsion of the members of the opposition from the party. The congress responded with an ovation to final reasoning of Stalin's closing remarks:

"If you examine our party's history, it is clear that always at the time of certain serious turns in our party some old leaders have fallen out of the cart of the Bolshevik Party, making room for new people. A turn is serious business, comrades. Turn is dangerous for those who are not securely seated in the party cart. Not everyone can keep his balance during a turn. The cart has made a turn, you take a look, and some people have fallen from it (applause). Let us take 1903, the period of our party's second congress. This was a period of the party's turn away from agreement with the liberals toward a mortal struggle against the liberal bourgeoisie, from preparation of the struggle against tsarism toward open struggle against it for the total rout of tsarism and feudalism. A six-man group headed the party at that time: Plekhanov, Zasulich, Martov, Lenin, Akselrod and Potresov. The turn proved fatal for five of this six-man group. They fell from the cart. Lenin remained in a number of one (applause). It turned out that the old leaders of the party, the founders of the party (Plekhanov, Zasulich, Akselrod), plus two young ones (Martov and Potresov) were against one leader, also a young one, Lenin.... It is now clear to every Bolshevik that without Lenin's resolute struggle against the five, without the supplanting of the five, our party could not have rallied as a party of Bolsheviks capable of leading proletarians to the revolution against the bourgeoisie (cries of "true!")" Having listed other turns and others who "fell from the cart,"

Stalin ended: "The same should be said about the present period of our revolution. We are now experiencing a period of turn from the restoration of industry and agriculture toward modernization of the entire national economy and its restructuring on a new technical basis, when the building of socialism is no longer just a prospect but a vital practical cause requiring the surmounting of most serious difficulties of an internal and external nature. You know that this turn has proven fatal for the leaders of our opposition, who took fright at the new difficulties and who intended turning the party toward capitulatory conduct. And if there are now certain leaders who are unwilling to sit tight in the cart who are falling out, there is nothing surprising in this. This will merely rid the party of people who are hobbling along and hampering its progress. They earnestly wish, evidently, to free themselves from our party cart. Very well, if some of the old leaders who are becoming worn out intend dropping out of the cart, it serves them right! (Stormy, prolonged applause. The whole congress rises and accords Comrade Stalin an ovation)."

The speaker did not stress the coincidences: there were six in the "cart" in 1923, following the departure of Lenin, as in 1903. As then, three old ones (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev) and three younger ones (Stalin, Bukharin, Pyatakov). The coincidence was undoubtedly fortuitous, but was it fortuitous that Stalin had led the audience up to it? The reduction of the most diverse events of the party's quarter-century history and the most varied persons to a single "cart theory" confirming some regularity of the ejection of the majority of leaders with just one being left behind was very deliberate. Nor was the attachment of the long opposition struggle begun in 1923 to the turnabout of 1927 all that dexterous. Nor did the speaker stress the differences also: the 15th congress ejected from the "cart" not five but four. There remained two, both young: Stalin and Bukharin. But, then, no one promised that this would be the last turn.

Once again we recall the date: December 1927.

But now let us walk on further. Not far, right close by: January 1928.

On 15 January 1928 Stalin traveled to Siberia. In Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Omsk and Rubtsovsk he assembled the party aktiv and held meetings. It had not been a month even since the congress, at which Stalin—as 1 year, 2 years and 4 years before—had flayed Trotsky's "leftism" and unswervingly and eloquently upheld the general line of the party and Lenin's plan of the transition to socialism. But no one was ever to hear this Stalin again. Both in these first public speeches since the 15th congress and in all subsequent speeches another voice was heard. They may be termed public, incidentally, with one reservation: they were made public for the first time 21 years later, and then in a brief transcript, what is more.

The subject was narrow, specific: grain procurements. The approach to the subject had been broad, as befits a leader. At first, the topic of the day: the procurements plan was not being fulfilled, therefore pressure had to be brought to bear. How? Very simply: with judicial and procuracy officials applying the article of the Criminal Code governing profiteering. After all, it was clear that the plan was not being fulfilled owing to the fact that the kulaks wanted to profiteer in grain.

This was prudent: starting the turn of the "cart" with a blow at the kulaks. A dangerous moment, after all, the "cart theory" did not provide an answer to the question of whose turn it was to fly out at the turn. Therefore it was necessary to begin somewhat more gently. The communists had no reason to like exploiters, and, clearly, defense of the party line was necessarily least assured precisely on this point. Nonetheless, the local officials argued with the general secretary. They were, evidently, of the old school, and, what is most important, they had all too diligently read what he himself had been saying a month or two back. They had to be made to understand:

"You say that application against the kulaks of article 107 is an extreme measure, that it will not produce good results, that it will make the situation in the countryside worse. Comrade Zagumennyi is particularly insistent on this point. Let us assume that this is an extreme measure. What, then? Why has the application of article 107 in other regions and oblasts produced magnificent results, rallied the toiling peasantry around Soviet power and improved the situation in the countryside, but with you, in Siberia, it is allegedly to produce bad results and make the situation worse? Why, on what grounds? You say that your procuracy and judicial authorities are not prepared for this. But why in other regions and oblasts...."

Enough, perhaps. The "theoretical substantiation" for the departure from the general line was clear: "why in other regions...."

But, after all, the general secretary had not immediately following the congress darted off for 3 weeks merely to improve grain procurements in the Siberian region. Having taken hold of this shaft, he embarked upon a more radical turning of the "cart" of party policy:

"There are no guarantees that the sabotage of grain procurements on the part of the kulaks will not be repeated next year. In addition, it may confidently be said that as long as the kulaks exist, there will be sabotage of grain procurements also. In order to put grain procurement on a more or less satisfactory footing other measures are needed. Which precisely? I refer to the development of the construction of kolkhozes and sovkhozes."

Just so. Not from the fundamental task of socialist transformation of the countryside but from current

grain-procurement necessity, it transpires, we needed to approach the idea of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The profoundest social revolution constituting, according to Lenin, an entire era ("one or two decades, at least") had become with Stalin a current campaign, which could, like grain procurements, be conducted by administrative means. No opposition force, perhaps, had gone as far in its thinking as this. But, after all, it was not a question of theory here. Collectivization had to be substantiated by current, acute necessity—otherwise escaping from one's past words about cautiousness, the harmfulness of haste, about the fact that mass collectivization was a matter for the future and that we had not yet approached it would be impossible. But it was unfailingly necessary to escape from these words. For in spite of everything that had been said and written prior to this, Stalin now considered it possible to set a timeframe for this major social transformation. Not approximate but precise, not distant but close: "...we need to strive to ensure that within the next 3-4 years the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, as the deliverers of grain, can supply the state with at least one-third of the requisite grain."

However, nor was this an end to the turning of the "cart". It was not to the kulaks that such a frightening stopover with the prosecutors and Criminal Code led, it was not the kulaks whom the Siberians who argued with the general secretary feared to offend. Things only began with the kulaks—with whom else!—but they led further: "it is necessary to cover all parts of our country, without exception, with kolkhozes (and sovkhozes) capable of replacing as the deliverer of grain to the state not only the kulaks but also individual peasants."

Not only indisputable, seemingly, but old hat also. Kolkhozes were necessary, who would argue with this! What was new was that this had been made dependent on an urgent, current matter, on grain procurements. What was new was that the general secretary, who only yesterday had been praising the excellent union of state industry and the peasantry via various cooperatives, via state trade, via the state syndicates (forward contracting) was now declaring that the Soviet system could not be supported on two heterogeneous foundations—socialist industry and individual agriculture.

No, it was no accident that he did not publish these notes for 21 years. In 1949 there was no longer anyone for him to fear, but in 1928 this would have been an outrage: indecent. After all, it was not a month since the 15th congress, which had expelled from the party the members of the opposition for the same speeches.

A letter to all All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) organizations, "First Results of the Procurement Campaign and the Party's Further Tasks," was also published for the first time only in 1949. It had been signed thus: "p.p. the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee, I. Stalin". Written in February, immediately following his return from Siberia, it contained the

ideas which had been road-tested in the January speeches. But this was now a document, albeit not for publication. Certain inevitable questions could not simply be "forgotten" here. The following, for example: what about the state reserves, which hit the kulak so successfully just yesterday even? An elegant step had to be executed in this direction: "But the state did not, as you know, have these reserves." And in the same letter: "Talk about us allegedly abolishing the NEP and introducing grain requisitioning and de-kulakization and so forth is counterrevolutionary prattle, which needs to be resolutely combated." Lest we forget.

And, of course, the letter gave a stern warning against excesses. The Criminal Code to be applied, but no unlawful arrests. Self-taxation to be stepped up, but apportionment—on no account. And none of this leftist direct commodity exchange, and only "in exceptional cases permitting in respect of commodities in desperately short supply the extension of cooperative shareholders' privileges to peasants not part of the cooperative system when they sell their grain." Is it clear now?

And then followed the report "Work of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission April Joint Plenum". For some reason or other it began with a large—almost one-third of the report—section on "Self-Criticism," although this question had not figured at the plenum. It was reported that we needed self-criticism as we needed air and water. Lest it remain unclear, Stalin indicated directly who needed to be criticized: leaders. Just so, in revolutionary fashion: lest they become divorced from the masses, they need to be criticized. And he took the masses to task somewhat for "beginning to look upward at leaders, screwing up their eyes, and frequently being afraid to criticize their leaders." And he held out the threat of the destruction of the party if leaders gave themselves airs. And he issued the appeal: "...Soviet people need to be given the opportunity to 'swear at' their leaders...." And became more specific: "...it is necessary to listen attentively to Soviet people's every criticism, even if it is sometimes not entirely and not in all parts correct." It probably never occurred to many people at that time to wonder what was the point, following the smashing of all opposition groups, of so much about self-criticism, of the command given for leaders to be sworn at, what is more. But now we simply recall what the top man in China did when he wished to kick out the next in line. He released the Red Guards: "Fire on Headquarters!"

The same report explained anew the question concerning article 107 of the Criminal Code. In February, we recall, it had been written that this was only for a single occasion, for this year. In April there was a further tightening of the screws of the "cart": "...if in the next procurement year there are no special circumstances and the procurements come in normally, article 107 will not be applied. Conversely, if special circumstances ensue and capitalist elements start to play games once again, article 107 will again put in an appearance."

The first round fired against the real target of all these maneuvers was heard in May. In the "On the Grain Front" discussion Stalin said, without naming them initially, that "there are people" who do not understand the significance of the struggle against the kulak. Talk to the effect that the kulak was no more dangerous than the urban NEP-man was declared "idle liberal prattle" dulling people's vigilance.... It was explained that the petty capitalist in the city was opposed by large-scale industry, but the kulak, merely by as yet infirm kolkhozes and sovkhozes. True, the same had been said by the "new opposition," and issue had been taken with it at that time by the general secretary himself, reasonably objecting that that same state industry, transport, state trade and the banks would oppose not only the urban but also the rural capitalist and be successful. Stalin at that time branded Kamenev and Zinovyev "panic-mongers" scared of the kulak and "faint-hearts" with no faith in the victory of the socialist economy. But he was now saying that a failure to understand how strong the kulak was "means going mad, breaking with Leninism and going over to the side of the enemies of the working class." And following the abuse, to business: "The broad wave of formation of new kolkhozes and the expansion of the old ones at the start of this year are to provide a significant increase in grain production on the kolkhozes by the end of the year." A "broad wave" already. Of course, when preparations were being made to show the peasants the benefits of the collective farm in practice, no one anticipated a "broad wave" all at once and significant results by the "end of the year". But article 107 had only to be demonstrated, and there's your wave, and time was measured by different yardsticks.

Propounding his line at the April plenum, Stalin attempted to take advantage of the first victory to lessen somewhat the binding nature of the decisions of past party congresses. In June he wrote the letter "Reply to Frumkin," which he sent to members of the Politburo (published for the first time in 1949). Frumkin, who worked in the grain procurement field, had attempted to give a reminder concerning the decisions of the 14th and 15th congresses. And Stalin said in reply to him, first, that the 14th congress was altogether beside the point here and that there was no point pulling us back—we had already moved that far forward. And the 15th congress—it had called for a struggle against the kulak. On how both the congress and he himself had interpreted this struggle at that time Stalin remained silent. He tried with might and main to prove that the special measures were in fulfillment of the decisions of the 15th congress.

But a hitch occurred in July. The turning of the "cart" ran into resistance at a Central Committee plenum. The plenum lasted 9 days. Stalin delivered at least three big speeches, and these speeches contain a direct indication of the arguments on the basic questions of rural policy.

And here also he employed one of his favorite methods of tricking the public. If we compare his speeches at the plenum, published for the first time 21 years later, and his report to the Leningrad party aktiv on the results of the plenum delivered the next day and published immediately, there once again appear before us two different people. At the plenum Stalin twisted and turned, defending the main thing: continuation of the artificially low grain prices. This was the key to the most fundamental Trotskyist line—accelerated industrialization thanks to supertaxation of the countryside—from which ensued all the rest: the special measures (given the low prices, grain could not be extorted without them), accelerated collectivization, also for facilitating grain procurement, dekulakization. In his 9 July speech (not for publication) Stalin said candidly that the peasantry “is paying the state not only the customary taxes, direct and indirect, but overpaying in the comparatively high prices for the commodities of industry, this is the first thing, second, it is experiencing a greater or lesser shortfall in the prices of agricultural products. There is also the additional tax on the peasantry in the interests of the upsurge of industry serving the whole country, including the peasantry. This is something like a ‘tribute,’ something in the way of a supertax....” Expounded here is a policy not only in essence but even in form and in words so frankly Trotskyist that you might have expected that the general secretary would now be assailing it as he had been doing repeatedly even recently. But he continued (from where we interrupted the quotation): “...which we have been forced to adopt temporarily to maintain and develop further the present rate of development of industry....” Forced, and that was that. Arguments? Certainly: “We would not be Bolsheviks were we to gloss over this fact and close our eyes to the fact that without this additional tax on the peasantry, unfortunately, our industry and our country could not in the meanwhile cope.” Here was an undoubted “step forward” compared with previous speeches, in which such a path of industrialization had been angrily rejected. Stalin went on to say that this additional tax could be done away with, first, only gradually, in a number of years, and, second, by way of a lowering of the price of industrial commodities and reduced grain-production costs. The path of an increase in the price of grain was thereby not accepted even for the future. A speech at the plenum 2 days later went even further: the opponents of the general secretary had themselves renounced “a policy of restoration prices” for grain (restoration prices were prices covering production costs. What the state’s intention of not paying restoration prices for years meant for the peasantry it is not difficult to understand). But a further 2 days later, in a report “for publication” on this occasion, Stalin reported with satisfaction the plenum’s decision to carry through “a certain increase in the price for grain....” He thus put down to his credit the plenum decision which he had fervently opposed.

This was the third clause of the plenum’s decisions communicated in the report on its results. The first two had been as follows: “a) an immediate end to the practice

of making the rounds of the homesteads, illegal searches and all violations of revolutionary legality; b) an immediate end to each and every relapse into grain requisitioning and any attempts whatever to close down the bazaars....” This very list of means of influencing the peasantry employed even prior to the proclamation of the policy of “elimination of the kulaks as a class” is curious, and it was not of the kulaks that Stalin was speaking here but of the peasantry as a whole. The resolve to abolish these measures was particularly touching if it is considered that not only by the January speeches had the general secretary himself sought their imposition but just 4 days previously, at the plenum, had explained in detail how wrong were those who believed that special measures could be ruled out in the future. He had quoted Lenin here. And had not noticed (or had not deemed it necessary to notice) that the quotation from Lenin hit rather at him than at his opponents. Lenin had written that special measures could not be ruled out forever because “they could be compelled by, for example, war....” So it was war.

On this occasion, however, there was a hitch: Trotsky himself had done Stalin a bad turn. The July plenum partially abolished the special measures. Trotsky, however, who may well not have known what Stalin’s attitude toward this was, assailed this decision in an open letter, defending the policy of special measures. Having gained such a supporter, Stalin found himself in the eyes of the initiated, that is, the plenum participants and the more or less broad party aktiv, in a highly embarrassing position. This embarrassment grew even more when Bukharin wrote in PRAVDA his celebrated article “Notes of an Economist”.

At first sight it would seem perfectly natural that Bukharin—Stalin’s right hand in the business of the theoretical rout of the Trotsky-Zinovyev bloc and main target of the attacks of the members of the opposition—would present a comprehensive critique of Trotsky’s views. But the further into the article one reads, the stranger its tone seems. It was several months since the Trotskyites had been expelled from the party, they had been arrested and exiled with undue fuss and ceased to exert the least influence on party policy, but there was such passion, such fervor in Bukharin’s article that it was as though it were a question of the present time, that a struggle was in full swing and that the danger was great. And suddenly the coin drops: so it is, the enemy is not in the past, he is right before one in the flesh. The “Trotskyites” are only a pseudonym and method of the author of the article. His adversary is Stalin. It was he who in recent months had been saying all against which Bukharin was now fulminating. True, the Trotskyites had been saying this also, which is why Bukharin had been able to conceal the criticism with a pseudonym, making a direct retaliatory blow more difficult. But the Trotskyites had spoken earlier, Stalin was speaking now. Here is an example. Since the start of 1928—in the January speeches, then at the April plenum, then at the July plenum—Stalin had been reiterating persistently that the countryside had

been growing rich thanks to 3 years of good harvests in succession and could now put by the grain surpluses. The conclusion from this proposition is clear: there had been a distortion to the detriment of industrialization and to the benefit of the countryside and that under these conditions demanding an increase in the prices for grain was absurd, it was necessary, on the contrary, to put some pressure on the countryside and exact "tribute" from it to benefit industry.

This sounds very revolutionary, particularly if it is considered that after the words "the countryside is growing and getting rich" Stalin put in that the kulak was growing rich particularly. Who would not want to strip the exploiters in favor of socialist industry? But this was merely words, albeit eloquent ones. And against this (that is, of course, not against this but against the arguments of the Trotskiyites, which were similar word for word) Bukharin had facts and economic analysis. Columns of figures were aligned in a conclusive finding: the peasants' incomes were growing, but grain farming here had been undermined by the inordinate confiscation of resources in favor of industry. Bukharin proves with figures to hand that the earnings of hunters accounted for almost half the increased income of the countryside, which meant, first, the accelerated growth of industry given the far from brilliant situation of grain farming and, second, the general growth of income was by no means kulak income: hunting meant nothing to the kulaks. The practical conclusions were clear also: the country, including industry, had no need of a stimulation of hunting since there was a surplus of manpower as it was, yet the undermining of the grain base was dangerous, primarily for industrialization itself. Bukharin assailed Trotsky's letter against the decisions of the July plenum on cancellation of the special measures with particular ferocity and an anger that was almost manifestly contrived.

It was here ascertained how difficult it is when turning the "cart" to eject another and sit tight oneself. Bukharin had not opposed the party line from the opposition platform nor had he leveled personal criticism at Stalin, on the contrary, he had defended the general line. But so fervently that the general secretary would keep running into it himself.

It was too late to retreat, Stalin could only broaden the attack. In October he delivered at the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Moscow Gorkom and Moscow Control Commission plenum the speech "Rightwing Danger in the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)," which was published in PRAVDA. Stalin tried to prove that there was a rightwing deviation in the party and that this was not a trifling but a serious phenomenon and cited its basic characteristics: the right were opposed to the struggle against the kulak and in favor of a winding down of the pace of industrialization. He then maintained that although of the two dangers—right and "left"—"both are worse," it was necessary, for all that, to concentrate attention on struggle against the right for "in

the years of struggle against the 'left,' Trotskiyite deviation the party has learned much, and it was now difficult to fool it with 'left' phrases" (what had happened to those golden days of 1925-1927, when the party, as its general secretary maintained, was immune to danger from the right! Just a few months had elapsed, and it was ready to succumb to this danger).

In November 1928 the Central Committee plenum discussed the control figures for the 1928/29 economic year, the first year of the Five-Year Plan. Stalin's speech at this plenum was entitled "The Country's Industrialization and the Right Deviation in the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)". The speaker posed three questions right at the start of the speech: concerning the pace of industrialization, concerning agriculture and concerning the right deviation. The most diverse topics were broached in connection with the first question: the "industrialization" of Peter the Great, Lenin's pre-October article and an argument to the effect that if only ours were like German industry, a particularly high rate of industrialization would not be necessary. One thing was not given a single word's mention, namely, what was most directly related to the subject: the 15th congress and its 5-year plan directives. And no wonder: the guidelines of Stalin's speech were the direct opposite of the congress' line for a one-sided task was being advanced now: the accelerated development of heavy industry. Nor was the congress mentioned in connection with the second question, concerning agriculture. And only in connection with the third question, concerning struggle against the right deviation, was there mention of the 15th congress. Not without irritation: "...the 15th congress has been dragged in irrelevantly to both the country and the town here." These words begin the rebuke to Central Committee member Frumkin, who had once again sent a letter to the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and given a reminder once again of the decisions of the 14th and 15th congresses.

The year of 1929 began with Stalin's speeches at a joint session of the Central Committee Politburo and the Central Control Commission Presidium, which were published for the first time in 1949 in a brief transcript entitled "The Bukharin Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party". Names were named for the first time here: Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy. It spoke of the disagreements on the same questions—the pace of industrialization and ways of solving the grain problem—which were manifested for the first time at the July plenum. It was said here that the "Notes of an Economist" article was an attempt to revise or "amend" the line of the Central Committee. Later, in far more prolix speeches, but for publication, that is, which were published immediately, no room was found for mention of this article. It was embarrassing for Stalin to acknowledge publicly that he had recognized himself in the description of the position which Bukharin had criticized as Trotskiyite.

The first of such public speeches against Bukharin was that at the Central Committee and Central Control

Commission plenum in April, which was carried in PRAVDA at that time, incidentally, with big excisions. There also a fight which could not be lost was in progress. The plenum adopted the 5-year plan theses for the 16th party conference, which confirmed this plan. At this plenum official criticism of the right was developed in all details. It continued in other of Stalin's speeches throughout 1929 and 1930.

As of the middle of 1929 the general secretary was unusually outspoken. He had evidently convinced himself at the April plenum that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy had laid down their arms. This was also confirmed by the unprecedentedly sharp tone of his speeches. At one time he had held back Kamenev and Zinovyev, who had demanded immediate reprisals against Trotsky. Subsequently, having smashed the "new opposition" at the 14th congress, he let its leaders retain their high positions. It had always been others who had sought reprisals, and Stalin had agreed to them last. It was too early to show one's claws while there remained in the "cart" people other than him. And even in 1928, having written the article "They Have Sunk!" which justified the arrests and banishment of the Trotskyites, Stalin did not publish it—it appeared only after the war, when the corresponding volume of his works came out. But here, in respect of the right, whose transgressions were far fewer, and whose capitulation, swift and unconditional, he displayed unprecedented severity. At the April plenum Stalin demanded that Bukharin and Tomskiy be removed from office (the Comintern, PRAVDA and the AUCCTU), warning that, at the least attempt at insubordination, they would be expelled from the Politburo. There also pealed in this speech the first, as yet distant, thunder of the storm which erupted in 1937: Stalin hinted at Bukharin's complicity... in a conspiracy of the left SR's. From political disputes to a charge of antistate activity—this also was new. And at the same time understandable: once the last rival from the six had been beaten, there would no longer be anyone to fear, no one to feel ashamed before, no one to keep as an ally. Ultimately Stalin would not be afraid to acknowledge even that both the line of the 15th congress and the entire new economic policy elaborated by Lenin had been thrown out. Here is something from his speeches and articles of 1929-1930.

"Whereas earlier the kulak was comparatively weak... now... he has acquired an opportunity to maneuver on the market, acquired an opportunity to set aside grain, this currency of currencies.... It would now be ludicrous to count on it being possible to acquire grain from the kulak on a voluntary basis."

In the summer of 1928 even he had noted the dissatisfaction of the countryside, the threat to union even and determined precisely the reason for this: lacking reserves, the state had by way of special measures infringed upon the peasants' insurance grain stocks. Several months later, in the spring of 1929, he was mocking Bukharin, who was explaining the ferment in

the countryside by policy "excesses," and providing a new explanation: the ferment reflected an exacerbation of the class struggle, which exacerbation was inevitable given the offensive of socialism. The first but, alas, not the last time that words concerning the inevitability of exacerbation of the class struggle were heard.

Further, not embarrassed by the use of Trotsky's words, Stalin once again insistently repeated the proposition concerning the need for "tribute," a "transfer of resources" and a "supertax" on the peasants. Without troubling himself with a search for arguments, he would get by with a construction of the "this cannot happen because this never can happen" type: "Does not this mean that in collecting this additional tax we are thereby exploiting the peasantry? No, it does not. The nature of Soviet power does not permit any exploitation of the peasantry whatever on the part of the state." With the same degree of conviction an answer was given to the question of whether this additional tax was within the capabilities of the peasantry (this was precisely how it was said: "the peasantry"—Stalin did not even attempt to maintain that it was a question of a supertax on the kulaks). The answer: it was, because "this additional tax will be levied under conditions of the continuous improvement in the material position of the peasantry." That is, it was because it was. And in the Ukraine famine, from which peasants died, approached—striking testimony to the supertax "capability".

Also a subject of ridicule was what Stalin himself had been defending just 18 months earlier: "It is well known that Bukharin shies away from special measures like the devil from incense." It is interesting that these special measures are called in one place "the Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement". It was shown earlier how the general secretary had organized this "method" in Siberia, referring to "other regions and oblasts," but not naming them. Now Siberia was being given as an example to others. It is difficult to shake off the thought that at that time, in the Siberian speeches, these "other regions" which had successfully employed the procuracy in grain procurement were a myth.

Stalin's criteria of the soundness of party policy changed before one's very eyes. In 1928 even he had said in a speech that inasmuch as following the forcible confiscation of grain there had been no reduction in the sown areas, there was, consequently, no serious peasant discontent. And this—the absence or existence of a reduction in the sowings—was, of course, the true criterion. But Stalin was unwilling to apply it in 1929. He spoke of the cutback in the sowings (which had now already occurred) on the kulak (in his words) farms as proof of the need for special measures. Now even the uprisings were not proof of mistakes in policy. Stalin called the Bukharin group "small-minded" for the fact that it was "now attempting to use to its factional ends such a paltry trifle as the disturbances in Adzharia. In fact, what is this so-called 'uprising' in Adzharia compared with such uprisings as the Kronstadt uprising?" And, further: "It is

obviously being demanded of us that there be no discontented elements with us. Have they not lost their senses, these comrades from Bukharin's group?"

Even at the end of 1927 a turnabout in the peasants' consciousness in support of collectivization was seen as a distant and lengthy process, and an objective process, what is more, progressing in accordance with its own laws. And although official policy could speed it up or slow it down, this most important social transformation would, in any event, take place gradually and would not lend itself to planning even to the nearest year. In 1929 Stalin no longer doubted that he could control this process at will, determining timeframes to the nearest month or week. "We have succeeded in turning the bulk of the peasantry..." "we have succeeded in organizing this fundamental turnabout in the heart of the peasantry itself..."—these, according to Stalin, were the achievements of one year. We recall Lenin's: "prepare with work of a lengthy number of years...."

Concerning the laws and decrees confirmed by the 15th congress (including the impermissibility of de-kulakization), Stalin said: "Are these laws and these decrees contrary to the policy of liquidation of the kulaks as a class? Undoubtedly, yes! Consequently, these laws and these decrees will now have to be set aside in the areas of complete collectivization, the sphere of the occurrence of which is growing not by the day but by the hour." This was said in January 1930. There had been no congress yet since the 15th. It was not the congress which abolished the congress' decisions but Stalin.

He was hereupon asked by people of Sverdlovsk: since the new policy now is that of liquidation of the kulaks as a class, by what methods is it to be carried out? Answer: "The main method of liquidation of the kulaks as a class is that of mass collectivization. All other measures should be adapted to this basic method. All that is contrary to this method or detracts from its significance must be discarded." At first sight this answer contains merely simple tautology. Clearly, complete collectivization signifies the liquidation not only of the class of kulaks but also the class of individual peasants in general. Perhaps Stalin wished to say by this that de-kulakization was unnecessary, that it was necessary merely to drive the kulaks into the kolkhozes somewhat more quickly? No, he explained precisely that de-kulakization was necessary and that former kulaks could not be admitted to the kolkhozes. He also abused the right for defending the policy of the formation of cooperatives, this preliminary phase of collectivization, which had even recently satisfied him and which, incidentally, allowed of the kulaks' participation in the cooperatives, albeit with limited rights. So what was the meaning of this answer? To equate de-kulakization and collectivization, seemingly unintentionally, and to put both on a par with liquidation of the kulaks as a class. Stalin had expressed himself formally (and theoretically) correctly, so correctly that it was as though he had said nothing (if this answer is viewed in isolation from the other answers

of the discussion). But in the heat of the "great change" it cost the masses of local officials nothing to perpetrate a logical error: if collectivization is the method of liquidation of the kulaks as a class, liquidation of the kulaks as a class (in respect of the other speeches read: "de-kulakization") is the method of collectivization. Stalin did not make this mistake, God forbid. He only left it to others to make it. Others slid from banishment of the kulaks to banishment of "kulak followers" and then to middle peasants' agitation for kolkhozes with the pistol—all this is described clearly enough by Sholokhov in "Virgin Soil Upturned," Zalygin in "On the Irtysh" and others.

And Stalin arrived to rectify "others'" mistakes. Having inflamed passions and allowed to be done what he needed doing, the messiah appeared with his "Dizzy With Success" and "Reply to the Comrade Kolkhoz Members".

These two speeches and also the Central Committee decree of 14 March 1930 based thereon "Struggle Against Distortions of the Party Line in the Kolkhoz Movement" clearly show both the methods of liquidation of the kulaks and, what is most important, the methods of collectivization. Stalin mentions the threat of military force and the threat of deprivation of water for irrigation (in areas of irrigable farming) and industrial commodities and the tolerance of "coercion in the sphere of economic relations with the middle peasant."

However, it was necessary to draw the line such as not to hamper that same pace and to further drive the middle peasant into the kolkhoz. This is why, having made very brief mention of the main thing—violation of the voluntary approach in the kolkhoz movement—the decree then concentrated attention on trifles on which a retreat caused no regrets: the "bungled vaulting" from the artel form to the commune, the closure of the churches and bazaars, the socialization of small-scale livestock and poultry and the elimination of the attached truck gardens. It was proposed emphatically putting an end to all this. But, on the other hand, consolidating the most important thing—the pace of collectivization which had been set. The prescription of a timeframe increasing the percentage of collectivization "in certain areas" to 90 in several days was called "bureaucratic rule by decree," but the raising of this percentage in 12-18 months throughout the country to 40-50 percent was called a success. And the Central Committee decree on the pace of collectivization prescribing a very short timeframe—1-2 years, in the main—for completion of the collectivization in all the main grain areas was corroborated. This decree (January 1930) did not accord either with the decisions of the 15th congress adopted prior to Stalin's turnabout or with the 5-year plan adopted by the 16th party conference after this turnabout: after all, it had envisaged 20 percent collectivization in 5 years, but the result had been 40 percent in 1 year. Stalin boasted of this. And had preceded the criticism in "Dizzy With

Success" with the main demand: "consolidate the successes which have been scored and use them in planned manner for further advancement." And in the "Letter to Comrade M. Rafail," which was not intended for publication at that time, he wrote candidly about his "Dizzy With Success" and the attendant decisions: "There was no turnabout in policy here in March 1930. We called to order comrades who had gone too far—that is all."

As later also, in 1929 Stalin insistently upheld the sole motive for an acceleration of collectivization: solution of the grain problem. In confirmation of this he did not stop short at dishonest statistics, citing figures to the effect that the kolkhozes and sovkhozes were already producing more grain than had been produced by the kulaks, and the problem of "replacing kulak production with kolkhoz and sovkhoz production" was thereby being solved. Yet it was clear that the problem would be solved only in the event of the kolkhozes replacing not only kulak production but that of all the middle and poor peasants, who had joined these kolkhozes. And the middle peasants were the principal holders of grain so that, "forgetting" about them, Stalin simplified the task considerably. He did not stint on promises: "Thanks to the growth of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz movement, we are finally emerging or have already emerged from the grain crisis. And if the development of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes progresses at an intensified pace, there is no reason to doubt that in some 3 years our country will have become a most grain-rich, if not the world's most grain-rich country!" Three years—what a familiar timeframe! Stalin did not like to make people wait for what he had promised more than 3 years. However, 3 years after these promises our country had not become the world's most grain-abundant country—it was a country with grain ration cards. And if for all that the starving peasants built the kolkhozes and the starving workers built Magnitka and Kuznetsk, it was not thanks to Stalin's leadership but in spite of it. It was not the last time, however, that he would exploit the people's heroism.

Clearly, the grain problem was not being solved by such methods—its solution could only be thwarted in this way, which is what Stalin did. The negative consequences of Stalin's method of collectivization were made good in grain farming only several years later, in animal husbandry, decades later. It is hard to say whether they were ever removed at all in the mentality of the peasants, who came to regard labor on the kolkhozes in the same spirit (the kolkhoz system accords with the interests of the peasantry, and the evil lay not in collectivization in general but in the perverted methods by which it was implemented. These methods themselves did not amount to administrative violence against people—naked violence against all peasants was beyond the capacity even of Stalin. It is more accurate to speak of violence done to the objective laws of social development, which included repression, deception, tax pressure, exploitation of the enthusiasm of the progressive peasants and exploitation of the basest feelings of the

mob—like sharing out the property of those who had been de-kulakized. The peasantry had to pay for everything—this is why the word "violence" most clearly expresses its idea of Stalin-style collectivization).

One goal was achieved: with shouting and clamor concerning the danger from the right the "cart" was turned, and Bukharin flew out at the turning. Prior to the 16th congress even he had been expelled from the Politburo. Trotskiy and then Kamenev and Zinovyev had also attempted to change party policy between congresses—and had failed. The general secretary succeeded. He arrived at the 16th congress victorious.

Perhaps it was precisely the perception of victory and undivided power as yet unpoisoned by the sorrow of defeat which the economy was preparing for him in 1931-1933 which prompted Stalin to unusual candor at the congress in June 1930. He did not conceal the fact that he had initiated the revision of the optimum version of the 5-year plan in the direction of further acceleration, regardless of reality. He declared in the report to the congress that "further acceleration of the rate of development of our industry" was necessary and that "people chattering about the need to reduce the rate of development of our industry are enemies of socialism...." He praised the decisions concerning a rise in the control figures pertaining to the most important sectors. He developed a whole "theory" about the fact that planning does not end with the compilation of the plan and that it is necessary to upgrade the plan on the move.

Possibly, he really believed that the flows of pig iron and movement of the production lines were subject to his word—command, and they will move more quickly. Otherwise he would not have let the cat out of the bag in his lengthy discourse on the Trotskiyites' 5-year plan proposals. He had forgotten his past speeches to such an extent that he ventured to boast: we are more "superindustrialists" than the Trotskiyites inasmuch as we are proposing a higher rate than they did. Trotskiy's old reasoning (it was now called the "capitulationist dying curve theory") brought up by Stalin for derision was simply an exposition of the proposition commonly accepted in the party in 1925-1927 that the rate of the period of new building would inevitably be lower than the period of restoration. Finally, Stalin was so incautious that he adduced specific numerical proposals of Trotskiy and the Trotskiyites to counterpose them to his own and ridicule them. Trotskiy, it transpired, had once proposed for the 5-year plan an average annual increase in industrial output of 18 percent. Counterposing to this the 47 percent proposed for the 1930/31 economic year, Stalin could not have known that in 1930 the actual increase would be 22 percent, and in 1931, 20 percent, that is, very close to Trotskiy's figure and very far from his, Stalin's, figure. But he should have known that at the time when Trotskiy had made this proposal, this was the general opinion—18-19 percent, for example, had been proposed by the Kuybyshev Commission. Stalin himself had at that time termed a record an even more modest

rate—12 percent. But it was not ultimately a question of figures. The very intention to “out-Trotsky” the Trotskyites was typical. Even after this Stalin was still reiterating that the main danger in the party was the danger from the right!

Perhaps this was said more to preserve the conventions. Stalin no longer feared the right. He had won—it remained to pick up the pieces of the crockery broken in the fight. And here it transpired that much had been smashed and broken and that the tidying up would not be easy. Following the dashing turns, it was not only agriculture which had gone lame—industry had been hobbled also. Quite recently even calls for the criticism of “leaders” and for criticism to be supported, even if it contained only 5 percent of the truth, were being heard. But now, inasmuch as the right were no longer in the “headquarters,” the criticism of leaders could not mean criticism of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy. It could mean only criticism of Stalin and his people, who had replaced the right (Molotov, for example, had taken Rykov’s place in the Sovnarkom). And sounds of the retreat were heard. A Central Committee decision criticized the most fervent fault-finder—Demyan Bednyy. Unable to comprehend the essence of events and vexed by the sudden surprise, Demyan wrote a letter to Stalin. And in a long personal letter the general secretary gave the poet a telling off. He replied that, yes, his lampoons “contain a number of magnificent passages striking directly at the target” (really less than 5 percent?). But there was also “a fly in the ointment which spoils the whole picture.” This was “slander of our people and the debunking of the USSR....” How many times and from how many mouths have satirists subsequently heard such words!

However, the putdown of Demyan in no way helped pacify the economic machine, which had broken loose. In the speech “The New Situation—New Tasks of Economic Building” in June 1931 Stalin proposed breaking the industrial associations up into smaller units—that is, making administrative control of the enterprises more compact and bringing the departments closer to them. But such measures were manifestly no help now, and the failure of speedup was becoming increasingly apparent.

In 1932 the leader maintained silence. All his speeches for the year were accommodated on 25 pages of the 13th volume of his works—brief official greetings “on the occasion of,” one short foreign policy interview and one reply to letters containing questions on the history of Bolshevism. There was one article in the year—“The Significance and Tasks of the Complaints Bureau”. There was not a single speech in the year—he did not speak even at the 17th party conference, which discussed the Second Five-Year Plan directives and the plan for 1932. All the year’s publications together were shorter than a single speech at the meeting of industrial managers in June 1931—and there were two such meetings in 5

months that year, and Stalin spoke at both of them. Earlier still the articles and speeches of 1 year could not be accommodated in an entire volume of his works.

What had happened? It is not hard to guess: having obtained in 1931 a 20-percent increase instead of the 45 which he had demanded, the leader had understood that not everything in the economy was subordinate to commands. And for some time he had left it to others to drive the speedup cart, which had already done its work and which it was time to replace. It was not Stalin but Ordzhonikidze who gave the news in the report at the 17th conference of the increase in industrial output in the past year under what had been planned by a factor of just over two. And it was he who reported the planned increase for 1932 of 36 percent—just as impracticable as the preceding 45 percent. It was not Stalin but Molotov and Kuybyshev who gave out the fantastic control figures for the Second Five-Year Plan (when, 2 years later, the 17th congress confirmed the final directives, its figures had simply nothing in common with the conference’s outlines). Stalin considered it a good thing to step aside for a time in order with all the greater success to once again subsequently perform the role of the genius who was the first to abandon the old line—and who would venture to recall that it was he who had thought up this old line and he who had pushed it through, despite others’ protests?

In January 1933 Stalin delivered his first speech for 18 months, more precisely, the report “Results of the First Five-Year Plan” at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). The naive individual would probably have expected to see in a report on such a topic tables, many tables: in one column, what had been planned, in the other, what had been the result. And figures in the body of the report, many figures: what had been planned and what the result had been. Could economic results be described without this? They could, apparently. The report contained no tables—not one table. The report contained no figures on the industry plan, not one figure on what had been planned. There were just two figures in the report on plan fulfillment—percentages pertaining to the gross industrial product as a whole and heavy industry included. There were, on the other hand, a dozen and a half bourgeois press apophthegms on the 5-year plan. It contained also Stalin’s celebrated incantations: “We had no tractor industry. We have one now. We had no automotive industry. We have one now. We had no machine-tool manufacturing. We have....” and so forth. The report contained a lengthy discourse about the fact that socialism was better than capitalism, and industrialization better than the absence thereof. After 15 years of Soviet power members of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee had to be persuaded of all this, apparently....

But it could not be helped, the general secretary could not start to speak to the point: what is true is true, you know that there were arguments—not about whether to

undertake industrialization but about how to undertake it. Such-and-such a line prevailed, and produced such-and-such results. He could not say this. But it was time for a change of policy, and this change had to be substantiated. The speaker hit on the following gambit: "Was the party correct in pursuing a policy of the most accelerated pace? Yes, it undoubtedly was." There followed certain proof of this "correctness," but: "Can it be said that in the Second Five-Year Plan we will have to pursue precisely the same policy of the most accelerated pace?" For the naive individual there was no such question: after all, this had already been decided by the 17th party conference, and no one had rescinded its decisions. But Stalin was not a naive individual:

"No, this cannot be said. First, as a result of the successful implementation of the 5-year plan we have already basically accomplished its principal task—imparting to industry, transport and agriculture a base of new modern equipment. Should the country be whipped up and spurred on after this? Clearly, there is no need for this now. Second, as a result of the successful fulfillment of the 5-year plan we have already succeeded in raising the country's defense capability to the due height. Should the country be whipped up and spurred on after this? Clearly, there is now no need for this."

There is double-level cunning in this line of reasoning—one deviation from the truth is concealed by another. The audience's attention is concentrated on the upper level, the direct assertion: accomplishment of the principal tasks of industrialization had been completed. Given an uncritical approach, this could be accepted as the truth, given a critical approach, one might wonder whether this was the case. Take defense capability: could it be considered to be supported economically when industry was even weaker than in any major European capitalist country which was a potential aggressor: Germany, Britain, France...? And had a "base of modern equipment" already been imparted in full to industry, transport and agriculture? And these would have been fair questions. But not dangerous for Stalin. A person pondering merely these questions was already thinking on the prescribed track, thinking merely about whether speedup was necessary in the future. The question of whether it had been necessary in the past had been shunted aside. It stood to reason, as it were, that until the tasks of industrialization had been accomplished, there was cause to "whip up and spur on the country" (what words!). It stood to reason, as it were, that the speedup had been of some benefit and had brought closer the time of victory in the competition with capitalism. The most unpleasant truth: that speedup had made this time more remote was obscured.

It remained subsequently to impress the idea into the dependable form of a simple slogan. The right words were found: in the First Five-Year Plan the main thing had been the "fervor of new building," in the second, it would be the "fervor of assimilation". The fervors acquired numerical expression: the general secretary

explained that the annual increase in industrial output of 22 percent (he exaggerated slightly) had corresponded to the "fervor of new building," while 13-14 percent would be sufficient for the "fervor of assimilation". Following this plenum, the 17th congress was submitted directives essentially completely canceling those of the 17th conference. The figures were reduced in some respects at the congress. In fact the results of the Second Five-Year Plan in terms of the main sectors were just somewhat lower than the figures adopted by the congress.

Thus concluded the banked turn in industry. With agriculture things were more complex. After all, industry had indeed progressed by giant strides, and the fact that it could have progressed even more quickly and with fewer casualties—these were subtleties obvious to far from everyone. But agriculture had not progressed at all but had moved backward. It was more difficult here both justifying past policy and substantiating future policy.

This is what was said about the past policy: "Possessing tractors and agricultural machinery on the one hand and availing itself of the absence of private ownership of the land (nationalization of the land!) on the other, the party had every opportunity to accelerate the collectivization of agriculture." In what way nationalization of the land had helped the implementation precisely of forced collectivization and why prior to this no one had hit upon this, although the land had been nationalized in 1917, is an obscure question. And the assertion that it was possible to hasten collectivization inasmuch as tractors had appeared—this assertion merits attention if only because it was reiterated repeatedly before and after this speech.

The figures adduced by Stalin himself somewhat later, at the 17th congress, show that in the "year of the great change," there was not even one tractor per 20 kolkhozes, and even at the start of the Second Five-Year Plan, when collectivization had been completed in the main cereals areas, approximately half a tractor per kolkhoz had been acquired. As in many other instances, here also Stalin did not tie in a generally correct idea (that the benefits of large-scale equipment would prompt the peasants to joint management) with the actual application of this idea: it was not the case that in the First Five-Year Plan tractors could have won over the peasants en masse for the kolkhoz—there were not at that time masses of tractors.

In 1928 tractors accounted for 2.5 percent of the power capacity of agriculture, working livestock, 94.8 percent. Even in 1940 the preponderance of tractors could still not have been termed overwhelming: 37.1 percent compared with the 22.3 percent accounted for by working livestock, whose numbers had declined sharply by that time. Given such figures, purely Stalinist boldness was needed to explain the "great change" toward collectivization in 1929 not by administrative pressure but a change in the general convictions of the peasants with the tractor's arrival in the countryside.

The attitude toward labor and public property best shows the mood in which the peasant entered the kolkhoz. The average completion of labor-days per able-bodied kolkhoz member in 1932 was 118. Even in 1953, when the general decline in labor enthusiasm on the kolkhozes was described clearly enough by the Central Committee September Plenum, the corresponding figure was 295.

The principal property which the peasant brought to the kolkhoz was big livestock. Sholokhov described strikingly what agonies Grandpa Shchukar (a poor peasant in all respects, incidentally) went through to keep this property of his from being surrendered to the kolkhoz. How many such "Shchukars" were there? Even the decline in the head of cows from 29 million in 1928 to 19 million in 1934 fails to reveal the whole picture. The 19 million which survived were mainly cows of private subsidiary smallholdings or of individual peasants. At the end of 1932, when the collectivization had been carried through, in the main, there were only 2.6 million kolkhoz cows, and even by the start of 1941, only 5.7 million out of the total 27.8 million.

And one further figure—to describe the tending of livestock on the kolkhozes of the times of the "great change". The average annual forage cow milk yield on the kolkhozes amounted to 931 kilos in 1932. Whoever knows that a private smallholding does not keep a cow which provides less than 1 vedro [approximately 12 liters] of milk a day will understand that 900 liters a year is close to the productiveness of a good goat. Even in 1945-1946, when there was both drought and famine and the plowing was done with the kolkhoz cows, even then they produced more milk than in the year of the "great change".

Stalin also spoke in the report about the fact that collectivization no longer needed to be hastened along. It was clear: it had been completed, in the main, what was the point of accelerating it now. But this was not the end of the matter. Grain production had not been going according to plan, the area sown to cereals in 1932 was less than in 1930, and the gross harvest was less than in 1929 and in 1913. But there had to be grain. And Stalin spoke once again at the plenum, with the separate "Work in the Countryside" speech. This was a declaration of war on the kolkhoz peasantry now. First, the general secretary abused the local leadership for permitting the kolkhozes to create various stocks prior to the surrender of the grain to the state: stocks to feed themselves, forage and insurance stocks and so forth. First surrender to the state, then think about oneself. Second, he reported that enemies had made their way into the kolkhozes and were using the kolkhozes for the struggle against Soviet power. Policy and methods of work on the kolkhozes had to be changed with regard for this. He could not have put it more clearly. The kolkhozes remain for Stalin an enemy until the end—in his deathbed economic essay he pointed to them as the main obstacle en route to communism.

But this is the end of the story of how Stalin turned against Stalin. Henceforward the world would know only one Stalin; he was to skillfully make the most improbable turns, but never betrayed himself. The question of whether he was betraying himself even at this turnout or whether he had from the very outset been different from what he had seemed and had simply dexterously played the hypocrite might interest psychologists and writers. But this question is immaterial for a historical, for a political analysis. We are satisfied as to the actual fact that Stalin disavowed his own words and in 1928 burned all that he had worshiped and worshiped all that he had burned. On many important theoretical and practical questions he adopted purely Trotskiyist positions. One question, however, remains unexplained: why was he successful, why did he not fly out of the cart at this turn?

II

A leader should see further than the masses—this is why he is the leader. Sometimes it is his duty not to support but to curb the majority, in the name, albeit not yet recognized by all, of the interests of this majority. Thus Kutuzov in 1812 curbed the impatience of the army, which was retreating on its own territory. Thus Lenin curbed the revolutionary impatience of the party in the Brest period. Thus the party leadership in the period of the 14th-15th congresses curbed the communists' impatience to "strip the kulak". In all these cases the leader would not have been performing his duty to the people had he carried out the will of the people as the majority understood it. Consequently, a leader may be guilty of nonperformance of his duty also when he has not curbed passions and has associated himself with them, leaving the initiative to others.

Stalin was a past master at leaving others to make precisely the mistake which he needed, knowing in advance that this was a mistake and that in the future it would be obvious to all and that it would then be necessary to answer for it. In this event he would be elsewhere. In addition, he would readily assume the initiative of rectifying the mistake. This was the case with the story of the defense of Kiev in 1941 of sad renown. Stalin failed to give the order to abandon Kiev in time and even removed as chief of the General Staff Zhukov, who had been too insistent in seeking such a decision. But Stalin had organized matters such that outwardly the initiative of the defense of the city under hopeless circumstances was not his—this was clearly shown in his memoirs by Marshal Bagramyan. Stalin, evidently, was well aware of the shortcomings of Kirponosov, commander of the front—impulsiveness and higher-than-usual soldierly pride which did not allow him to insist on a retreat. The duty of a commander in chief in discussion with such a subordinate is to curb him and prevent him overstepping the mark. Stalin, on the contrary, played on Kirponosov's pride and was able to turn the discussion such that the commander of the front, who had only just arranged with his staff to insist

on a withdrawal, declared, to the horror of his subordinates, the opposite: we can hold out. He held out to the last and died together with the greater part of his troops. The gratitude shown to him was oblivion or the blackening of his memory in Stalin's lifetime—it could not be announced that in actual fact the supreme commander in chief had been to blame for the loss of the front.

Something similar was played out at the time of the First Five-Year Plan also. The "5-Year Plan in 4 Years!" slogan had not been thought up by Stalin. This slogan came from below, from the enterprises. It reflected both the noble enthusiasm of the builders of socialism and the economic illiteracy of the masses at large. The party was perfectly capable, without extinguishing the enthusiasm, of directing it into a useful channel—a struggle primarily for quality, prime costs and productivity given precise compliance with the plan deadlines and quantitative targets. But Stalin responded to "5 in 4" with "5 in 3".

Why did the leftist trend prove stronger at that time? There were, obviously, objective reasons for this also: primarily the predominance of the petty bourgeoisie in the population. The six leaders could have resisted the pressure of petty bourgeois consciousness, could themselves have submitted to it and could also have consciously exploited it. It was this latter which Stalin chose in the final encounter. The same path had been trodden (only with less success) before him by Kamenev and Zinovyev, who had also attempted to play on the "left" aspirations of the masses. Among their opposition associates was Pyatakov—the sole one of the six who in the period since Lenin had not performed an independent role. One other—Trotsky—was both "left" and right, not being, it has to be assumed, by conviction either one or the other—he was essentially not a Bolshevik at all. An outstanding revolutionary and organizer, he had not found (and had been unable to cobble together) a party "in his style" and in anticipation of the impending revolution had opted just several months prior to October for the Bolsheviks as the sole competent party. But this party never did become for Trotsky completely his party.

The sixth was Bukharin. This leader, who ended his career with the stigma of "right deviationist," was the leader of the "left" movement. He was "left" under Lenin and against Lenin. But there was no speculation in this position of his. He was "left" because he sincerely considered his position correct—this, in any event, was Lenin's judgment of him.

Decisive significance, of course, is attached to an evaluation not of the personal sources of the views of the "left" but to the social thrust of their ideas. Such an evaluation is contained in the title of Lenin's main polemical work of that period: "Left Puerility and Petty Bourgeois Character". It makes a celebrated analysis of Russia's five-structure economy, in which Lenin distinguishes the small peasant farm (and not large capitalist) as the main obstacle en route to socialism.

Almost every argument between Marxists and the "left" is outwardly (and in essence also to a considerable extent) an argument about the pace of advancement. It could be the argument of two persons standing at a railroad crossing—whether to cross the way after the train has passed or... a little before. The "left" are seemingly drawn whither other revolutionaries are drawn and intend crossing the road at the same spot—only always contriving to be somewhat faster. Lenin's argument with the Bukharin group on the question of the Brest peace was also an argument about whether Russia's proletariat should throw itself beneath the train in order to hasten world revolution.

The significance of this argument and its outcome are too widely known for the main historical facts to be repeated here. But some quotations from Bukharin's speeches at the seventh party congress, which decided the argument about peace in Lenin's favor, are very interesting for what is set forth subsequently. Here is the most typical judgment:

"Comrade Lenin said at the end of his speech that he would subscribe to any peace to evacuate the workers from Petrograd; I maintain that this is just a phrase, and not cold calculation but a most genuine animation of feeling, a very good feeling, of course, but one which is far from cold reasoning, which tells us that, if necessary, we can and must sacrifice tens of thousands of workers."

Let Bukharin not sound frivolously bloodthirsty on the grounds of this sentence taken out of context. He was, after all, thinking merely of returning to Lenin his reproaches leveled at "revolutionaries of phrase" and his appeals for cold calculation of the correlation of forces. The "left" had screamed the most in defense of the workers and peasants of the Ukraine, the Baltic and other areas which the Brest peace had given up to the Germans. Bukharin distinguished merely the "masses," and the vocabulary of his speeches at the congress shows full well the attitude of the "left" toward these masses: "the human material needs to be indoctrinated," "the masses need to be made to understand," "we must raise the masses to our level," "our sacred duty is to put pressure on the masses and involve them in the struggle." He also considered an effective method of "putting pressure on the masses" German occupation: let us fight, and even if we have to retreat on account of the workers and peasants being unwilling to fight, this is all right. Let them learn what "living under the Germans" means: "when an iron ring has been inserted in their nose, then, believe me, comrades, then we will have a real holy war."

Much later, when Bukharin had come to be called not "left" but "right," he would have occasion repeatedly to recall these speeches—particularly his words to the effect that revolution could develop at a price of the loss of the foremost workers.

The story of Bukharin—the most eminent theorist and favorite of the party—shows particularly graphically

how attractive for many people, how irresistibly strong is, given a revolutionary offensive, the inclination toward petty bourgeois "leftism" and how easy it is to swing people toward it and how difficult it has been to stop them—even when Lenin had stopped them. Bukharin gave the most graphic lessons in this—and Stalin was an attentive pupil. He had no wish to recall once again that Bukharin was "left" but did not himself forget his experience and explained the strength of "leftism" very clearly and correctly. Discoursing on the two deviations in the struggle against the kulak (exaggeration and underestimation of the kulak danger), Stalin said in the report to the 14th party congress:

"Both deviations are dangerous, they are both worse, and it cannot be said which of them is the more dangerous, but talk about the deviation which the party is most prepared to combat we can and should. If you ask the communists for which the party is more prepared—for stripping the kulak or for not doing such but moving toward an alliance with the middle peasant—I believe that 99 out of 100 communists would say that the party was most prepared for the slogan: hit the kulak. Just let them, and the kulak would be stripped in an instant. And as far as preventing de-kulakization and pursuing a more complex policy of isolation of the kulak via an alliance with the middle peasant is concerned, this would not be so easily digested."

Stalin understood that "left" policy was less complex and required less effort.

However, none of this even was news, Lenin had foreseen all this, and there was a well-balanced plan for getting rid of the petty bourgeois "leftism" of the masses under the political leadership of the party. Nor did the party itself succumb to the Trotsky-Preobrazhenskiy "leftism" in 1923, the Kamenev-Zinoviev "leftism" in 1925 and the "leftism" of all of them together in 1927. Why did Stalin's "leftism" pass in 1928-1929?

Particular circumstances which contributed to the "speedup" zeal at the time of preparation of the First Five-Year Plan may be found. For example, the voices of members of the Central Committee from the localities and leaders of republics and oblasts had a particularly concerted ring at the 16th party conference, which confirmed the optimum plan version. No one proposed less, all wanted more: give the Ukraine, Siberia, the Urals and so forth more. However, later, at the 17th congress, Ordzhonikidze replied to such speeches on the Second Five-Year Plan: that would prove to be a 10-year plan. At the time of discussion of the First Five-Year Plan the same Ordzhonikidze had been an avid "accelerator". After all, at the time of struggle against opposition or deviation his voice had carried much weight both by virtue of his authority and his office: in the period of struggle against the right he was Central Control Commission chairman. His personal honesty was above suspicion—this was proven not only by his life but also his death. He was not being cunning—he had sincerely erred. He had believed Stalin at that time—and not he

alone but the majority of the Central Committee. Perhaps he lacked political experience? No, this would not be valid. But even a Central Committee member and people's commissar breathes the same air as all simple mortals and he is affected by the surrounding atmosphere and pressured by the opinion of those around him and the passion of thousands and millions. And he no less and, perhaps, more than others feared becoming divorced from and lagging behind the people.

Here we approach the question which by the will of history is closely associated with the names of Kamenev and, particularly, Zinoviev.

"We are opposed to the creation of a theory of a 'leader,' we are opposed to making a 'leader'. We are opposed to the Secretariat, which in fact unites policy and organization, breathing down the neck of the political organ. We are in favor of our upper stratum being organized within in such a way that there be a really plenipotentiary Politburo uniting all politicians of our party and at the same time that there be a Secretariat subordinate to it and technically fulfilling its decrees. We cannot consider normal and believe it will be harmful for the party for the situation wherein the Secretariat unites both policy and organization and in fact predetermines policy to continue. This, comrades, is what needs to be done. Everyone who disagrees with me will draw his own conclusion. It is the speaker's right to begin with what he wants. It will seem to you that I should have started by saying that I personally do not believe that our general secretary is the figure who could unite around himself the old Bolshevik headquarters. I do not believe that this is the main political issue. I do not believe that this question is more important than the question of the theoretical line. I believe that had the party adopted a particular political line and had clearly dissociated itself from the deviations which are now supported by some of the Central Committee, this question would not now be next in turn. But I must go all the way. It is because I have said this repeatedly to Comrade Stalin personally, because I said this repeatedly to the group of Leninist comrades, that I repeat this at the congress: I have reached the conclusion that Comrade Stalin cannot perform the role of uniter of the Bolshevik headquarters. I began this part of my speech with the words: we are opposed to the theory of sole responsibility, we are opposed to the creation of a leader! With these words I end my speech."

These remarkable words were thrown in Stalin's face by Lev Borisovich Kamenev, member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Council for Labor and Defense. He uttered them on the platform of the 14th party congress on 21 December 1925 (on Stalin's birthday, incidentally). These words alone are sufficient to see that Stalin's opponents were not surrendering without a fight and that not all in the party had been deceived. We would add that people whom Stalin himself subsequently considered his enemies and with whom he dealt accordingly constituted the majority of congress delegates. Why,

then, why in response to Kamenev's words, which today are so comprehensible to us and at that time were so obviously close to the words of Lenin's "testament," why did the congress respond to Kamenev's speech with an ovation for Stalin?

We would have to begin with the fact that Kamenev himself and his associate Zinovyev contributed to this more than anyone. The bold and wise words quoted above by no means seem either bold or wise if read in the context of all that was intoned at the congress by the opposition. Kamenev drowned the one or two minutes of discussion of Stalin in a speech lasting more than an hour on "theoretical issues" (and, after him, Sokolnikov spoke in approximately the same manner), but the first speaker from the opposition, its "big gun"—Zinovyev—did not say a word in his report about the need to replace Stalin. Instead he looked for "deviations" in the policy of the Central Committee, which was wrong primarily in principle: Central Committee policy on the basic issues was correct. It was tactically naive also: taking it into one's head to contend with Stalin in this field!

Are we not being too severe on these people, who, whatever happened there, were the first to tell the party out loud what was in store for it? But the point is that at this moment they objectively did not weaken but strengthened Stalin. They tripped themselves up in declaring an unjust war on him and gave him a facile victory. It was no easy matter, three such figures—Kamenev and Zinovyev in the wake of Trotskiy. Together with Pyatakov, four of Stalin's five rivals. Back in the summer of 1917 the sixth congress had in one of its resolutions named Trotskiy and Zinovyev—after Lenin—"leaders of the world proletariat". They allowed Stalin to swallow them up—and he added their weight to his own, as it were. All their services in the revolution and the war he added, as it were, to his own, having proven the winner. And could now declare any war—just or unjust—on whoever he liked.

How had they "tripped themselves up"? Primarily in having acted too manifestly against themselves. And not only when they formed a bloc with Trotskiy, at whom previously they had been the first to cast stones—this was the final fall. They had acted against themselves at the 14th party congress even. Let us take the peasant question. Just a few months before the congress the 14th party conference had proclaimed a new policy in the countryside—that same policy which Kamenev and Zinovyev attacked at the congress. The conference had been led, however, by Kamenev, he had chaired all the sessions and had commended in a speech at the opening of the conference the "record" growth of industry and had approved the "turnabout toward the countryside". The final words spoken on the platform of the 14th party conference had been the words, full of optimism, of Kamenev: "...The Comintern... may be sure that we will prove by the correct policy of a strengthening of socialist

elements in our economy that, even given the slower pace of world revolution, socialism must be built and in an alliance with the peasantry of our country will be built and will be completed."

This was said on 29 April 1925. But on 21 December of the same year the same speaker said at the 14th congress: "Where lies the real danger? In the fact that, given the delay in world revolution, given the stabilization mood without and within, given a thriving... country, given the petty bourgeois surroundings in which the working class lives, elements of the embellishment of the NEP will inevitably grow."

Yes, believing in the sincerity of this speaker was difficult for the delegates to the 14th congress.

Kamenev had said at the 13th congress: "To the question, where is our plan, I answer: our plan does not consist of these abstract outlines. The plan which our party has been implementing throughout recent months, having begun with discussion, is embodied in two words: monetary reform. No other plan in the sense that this is the practicable direction and linkage of the entire course of the national economy around a single pivot, in the sense that we have a definite link having taken hold of which we might pull the whole chain—there could have been no other plan in the past months."

Of course, the state of the economy was different by the 14th congress than by the 13th: the monetary reform had long been completed, as also had the postwar restoration of industry, and many new opportunities of the planned influence of production, the most direct included, had emerged. No one would have maintained in December 1925 that monetary reform was the sole plan. But the general principle held good: the forms of the plan are determined by the content of the economic tasks to be tackled, consequently, at any given moment there are forms which are more suitable, less suitable and totally unsuitable. What, however, was said to the 14th congress by Kamenev, who had been so judicious at the preceding congress? This:

"Very well, you would like us to wait until the mentality and ideology of the peasantry which is unwilling to provide us with grain in the amount which we need for the development of socialism, unwilling to provide us with grain at a price which would be profitable to us, the worker state, has become absolutely crystal clear...?"

This is a different voice and different way of thinking to those of the Kamenev at the 13th congress. That Kamenev might have said that if the peasantry was unwilling to provide grain in accordance with the plan, it was not the peasantry but the plan which was to blame for this (the delegates to the 14th congress indeed shouted from their seats to Kamenev: it is the blunder of the plan, the blunder of the supreme management body—the Council for Labor and Defense—and its chairman—Kamenev).

After the 14th congress this truth remained at the disposal of others—not Kamenev. Others, including Stalin, explained that the plan should and could provide, first, for a realistic, and not one-sidedly beneficial, price and, second, for grain and other reserves for maneuver in the event of attempts to speculatively inflate prices. Kamenev still attempted to uncloud the issue: "...I am not suggesting that we organize the de-kulakization of the countryside. I am saying only that the correct line needs to be adopted...." But these were naive attempts. Whoever says that grain needs to be obtained from the peasants without the application of economic pressure might not agree with the need for administrative pressure: there is no third way. And it was no accident that Kamenev here, at the congress, had his nose rubbed in this contradiction. Mikoyan said: "If you are saying that the kulaks are stronger than the party supposes, then, if you please, one of two things: either more concessions or a fight with him now—either de-kulakization or more concessions to prevent the wrecking of economic building."

It turned out that Stalin had no need to design political weapons from scratch in 1928: he was able to take them ready-made from the arsenal of the 1925-1927 opposition. And he made quite extensive use of this opportunity.

Nor did Stalin himself think up the attacks on the "ingrowth" of the kulak (Kamenev had reiterated this charge repeatedly against Bukharin at the 14th congress). But in 1925 he had replied to this: we shall not give you Bukharin's blood. It is in general not difficult to see that the opposition had anticipated all Stalin's main steps of 1928-1930. Not only the propaganda clichés subsequently employed by Stalin but also the main tactical idea itself of donning the mask of "leftism" prior to an offensive against the party line, accusing others of right deviation, had belonged to it. And the organization of the Leningrad opposition delegation at the 14th congress was a real test laboratory for any organizer of a "turning of the cart".

One has to marvel at one particular feature of the opposition at the 14th congress: its geographical particularity. The Leningrad delegation consisted wholly of members of the opposition, there being hardly any of them in other delegations. This had not been the case previously. The social features of the Leningrad organization do not explain things in the least, on the contrary: this was the most progressive, most proletarian detachment of the party and least susceptible to petty bourgeois influence. The usual explanation is that on the eve of the congress the Leningrad party organization had been deceived by its leaders. Truly, the role of the leadership (Zinovyev held sway in Leningrad) was decisive, but it had secured its success not by deception but more dependable means. Although the Leningrad papers were in the hands of the opposition, they were not the sole source of information for Leningraders. The central

PRAVDA propounded the line of the Central Committee majority. Nor did the opponents of the provincial committee remain silent at the rayon and provincial conferences so the provincial party organization had information on the positions of both sides. No, the opposition could not have deceived the Petersburg workers, nor did it force them to remain silent—it is sufficient to take a look at the speeches of greeting of the representative of the Metals Plant and certain other enterprises to the congress. Lengthy "work" afterward, in the event of the opposition's victory, would have been required to compel silence. But by the congress this was not required, what was needed was something else, which Zinovyev's provincial committee secured: its own composition of the delegation to the congress.

Only one thing could explain this success of the opposition: the effect of such a powerful organizing force as the party machinery. The party machinery of the province was in the hands of the opposition, and it made full use of it. Information about the struggle for the machinery forced its way out in the speeches of the delegates to the 14th congress only rarely, but sufficient was said, for all that, for the nature of this struggle to be detected.

The Pskov delegate Struppe described how prior to the congress the first party conference of Northwest Oblast, which was to have incorporated five provinces, including Leningrad, had been prepared. The conference did not take place—the Pskov provincial organization had not agreed to it. Understanding had not been reached on representation: Leningrad had demanded for itself in the new obkom no less than four-fifths of the seats, whereas it had been given no more than three-fourths. The opposition had attempted to take possession of the machinery of five provinces instead of one, and this was what the struggle had been about, the general policy line remaining somewhere beyond consideration.

Another example. Molotov showed the congress the minutes of the plenum of the Leningrad Provincial Committee held prior to the provincial conference. With patriarchal artlessness the lists of the new provincial committee and provincial control commission compiled by the old provincial committee had been entered in the minutes. If the provincial committee could elect itself and carry through the decision at the conference, it could carry through there everything it wished. It also carried through its delegation to the congress, selecting people on whom it could depend and ejecting supporters of the Central Committee majority—even Komarov, who had previously been secretary of the provincial committee.

An attempt to capture the central machinery was described at the congress by Voroshilov. With evidently intentional naivety he described a secret meeting of several Central Committee members in a cavern near Kislovodsk, where it was contemplated rearranging the Central Committee Secretariat such as to remove power from Stalin.